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The IDEA Eligibility Mess
MARK C. WEBERt

INTRODUCTION

The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act,'
usually known as IDEA, guarantees students with
disabilities a free public education appropriate to their
needs,2 but students must first meet the definition of "child
with a disability." 3 IDEA controversies are a prominent
source of federal court business,4 and have generated four

t Vincent dePaul Professor of Law, DePaul University. B.A. Columbia, J.D.
Yale. Thanks to Robert Garda, Wendy Hensel, Andrea Kaufman, Michael
Perlin, Mitchell Rubinstein, and Paul Secunda for their comments on an earlier
draft. Thanks also to Kim Brown, David King, and Christopher Cook for their
research assistance.
1. 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1400-1482 (West Supp. 2008). For ease of reference in light
of the multitude of recent changes in the statutory provisions cited in this
Article, the West unofficial United States Code Annotated, rather than the
official United States Code, will be used throughout.
2. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1412(a)(1).
3. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1401(3).
4. Analysis of the results of a Westlaw search reveals the United States
Courts of Appeals issued fifty-six opinions in special education disputes in 2007.
Law schools are only beginning to appreciate the importance of special
education law. See Perry A. Zirkel & Sheilah D. Vance, Education Law Course
Offerings in Law Schools, 33 J.L. & EDUC. 327, 333 (2004) (reporting results of
survey of 123 law school dean respondents) ("[A] general education law course is
offered in the clear majority of the law schools, whereas special education law
and higher education law are each offered in slightly less than a quarter of the
law schools."); Posting of Jim Gerl to Special Education Law Blog,
http://specialeducationlawblog.blogspot.com/search?updated-max=2008-02.
21T15%3A59%3A00-05%3A00&max-results=7
(Jan. 18, 2008 13:44 EST)
(noting course offering course at DePaul); see also postings of mjstowe,
anonymous, and nick to
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Supreme Court decisions since 2005. 5 Many difficult issues
with the statute's interpretation have been resolved,6 and
others have developed into clear splits of authority, 7 but few
areas are so thoroughly unsettled, with so few guideposts,
as eligibility for special education services under the
statute.
In a word, IDEA eligibility is a mess. There are several
sources of the eligibility confusion. First, a set of recent
court cases has reached conflicting conclusions about how
much adverse educational impact the child's disabling
condition must have, what constitutes a sufficient need for
special education, and when children with emotional
disabilities are eligible. Second, educational authorities
have grown disillusioned with long-established methods for
evaluating learning disabilities. The United States
Department of Education is promoting a new method of
identifying learning disabilities, response-to-intervention,
but that innovation remains unproven and looks to be
extremely difficult to implement across disabilities and age
ranges. Third, Congress and others have focused renewed
https://www.blogger.com/comment.g?bloglD=1691205078500083881&postID=42
98439780823762853 (Jan. 20 - Feb. 26, 2008) (discussing Special Education
Law courses in law schools at Kansas, Southern California, and Pepperdine,
among others).
5. Bd. of Educ. v. Tom F., 128 S. Ct. 1 (2007); Winkelman v. Parma City Sch.
Dist., 127 S. Ct. 1994 (2007); Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy,
548 U.S. 291 (2006); Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49 (2005).
6. For example, the Supreme Court has ruled that hearing officers and
courts may award reimbursement to parents who purchase educational services
for their children who have been denied an appropriate education by the public
schools, Florence County Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7 (1993), although
an unresolved controversy exists over whether the child must previously have
been enrolled in public school for the remedy to apply, see Tom F., 128 S. Ct. at
1 (affirming reimbursement award by equally divided Court). Parents may sue
pro se in actions under IDEA. Winkelman, 127 S.Ct. at 2006. Prevailing parents
are not entitled to obtain expert witness fees as part of an attorneys' fees
award. Murphy, 548 U.S. at 291. The burden of persuasion falls on the party,
typically the parent, challenging the appropriateness of an educational program
rather than on the school proposing the program. Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 57-58.
7. Compare Frank G. v. Bd. of Educ., 459 F.3d 356 (2d Cir. 2006) (awarding
reimbursement to parent of child never enrolled in public school) with
Greenland Sch. Dist. v. Amy N., 358 F.3d 150 (1st Cir. 2004) (denying
reimbursement). Compare Weixel v. Bd. of Educ., 287 F.3d 138, 151 (2d Cir.
2002) (allowing damages claim under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West 2008) for
violation of IDEA) with A.W. v. Jersey City Pub. Schs., 486 F.3d 791, 803 (3d
Cir. 2007) (disallowing claim).
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attention on the disproportionate percentage of AfricanAmericans who are placed in special education under the
disability categories of mental retardation and emotional
disturbance. Nevertheless, no consensus has emerged on
how to address that condition.
Legal scholars have recently devoted a great deal of
attention to special education eligibility. Some work,
notably that of Professor Garda, stresses the need to read
the terms of IDEA's eligibility provisions rigidly, so as to
exclude students whose educational needs might be met by8
anything other than special education as precisely defined.
He would apply state law definitions in some instances to
narrow the eligibility standard. 9 Other work, notably that
of Professor Hensel, stresses the need to interpret the terms
of the IDEA eligibility provisions more loosely so as to
guarantee assistance to children with mild and moderate
disabilities who can succeed in the mainstream of public
education, rather than limiting IDEA eligibility to children
with the most severe impairments who can be served only
in restrictive placements. 10 Still other work, notably that of
Professors Weithorn and Perlin, points out that strict
readings of statutory eligibility terms keep many of the
children who most need educational help from obtaining an
entitlement to it under IDEA.11
This Article builds on the analytical framework of
Professor Garda and the insights of Professors Hensel,
Weithorn, and Perlin, but observes that the contemporary
8. See Robert A. Garda, Jr., Who Is Eligible Under the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Improvement Act?, 35 J.L. & EDUC. 291, 332 (2006).
Professor Garda, however, rejects many of the most restrictive judicial and
administrative rulings concerning special education eligibility, and reads
several of the statutory terms more broadly than some courts have done. See,
e.g., id. at 306, 315.

9. See Robert A. Garda, Jr., Untangling Eligibility Requirements Under the
Individuals with DisabilitiesEducationAct, 69 Mo. L. REV. 441, 497-98 (2004).

10. Wendy F. Hensel, Sharing the Short Bus: Eligibility and Identity Under
the IDEA, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 1147, 1152 (2007).

11. See Lois A. Weithorn, Envisioning Second-Order Change in America's
Responses to Troubled and Troublesome Youth, 33 HOFsTRA L. REV. 1305, 1357
(2005); Michael L. Perlin, 'Simplify You, Classify You': Stigma Stereotypes and
Civil Rights in Disability Classification Systems (Apr. 23, 2007), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=982226. Professors Weithorn
and Perlin address numerous other issues touching on special education
eligibility in the works cited.
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controversies over eligibility have aspects that find
insufficient discussion anywhere in the legal literature:
recent cases that restrict eligibility on flimsy grounds, new
assessment and service methodologies, and pressing needs
of populations that are being ill-served by both general and
special education. 12 The Article analyzes and critiques the
cases, describes and comments on the assessment
methodologies for learning disabilities, and evaluates
competing ideas about ethnic disproportion in identification
for special education. It concludes that the way out of the
entire set of problems is not a redefinition of special
education eligibility under IDEA, but rather a renewed
attention by courts and educational policy makers to the
actual terms of the statute and its underlying purposes.
The statute supports an entitlement to special education
services for a broad class of students, but the quality of
services needs to be improved and greater effort needs to be
made to provide these services in the regular education
environment.
Part I of this Article describes the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act. Part II discusses eligibility of
students for services under the Act, noting the statutory
terms, the reasons the provisions are there, and the
prospect that eligibility might decline as a source of
controversy. Part III tries to untangle the components of
the current IDEA eligibility mess: irrational court decisions,
challenges to existing evaluation methodology for students
with learning disabilities and the educational system's
response, and the persistent problem of overrepresentation
of African-Americans in some disability categories. Part IV
develops some proposed solutions to IDEA eligibility
problems,
specifically
reforms
of
the
caselaw,
recommendations regarding implementation of evaluation
methodology, and improvements in special education to
decrease
any
harm
resulting
from
minority
overrepresentation. The reforms suggested here are modest
12. The work of Professor Garda is a notable exception to this generalization
about inadequately served populations and special education eligibility. See

Robert A. Garda, Jr., The New IDEA- Shifting Educational Paradigms to
Achieve Racial Equality in Special Education, 56 ALA. L. REV. 1071 (2005). As
indicated below, the prescriptions advanced here differ significantly from those
of Professor Garda. See infra text accompanying notes 297-314. A number of
other sources discussing the particular problems of minorities in special
education will be discussed passim.

2009]

THE IDEA ELIGIBILITY MESS

and represent restoration of the letter and spirit of IDEA,
rather than its transformation, but they should provide a
way to solve the problems posed by current approaches to
IDEA eligibility.
I. THE INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT

The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
requires states that receive federal special education
funding to provide all children with disabilities a free,
appropriate public education. 13 Participating states and
their local school districts must furnish an appropriate
education to all children with disabilities, and must also
such
as
education,
to
services related
provide
transportation, physical and occupational therapy, sign
language interpretation, and school health services. 14 The
law requires that children with disabilities are to be
educated, to the maximum extent appropriate, with
children who do not have disabilities, and that school
districts have to afford the children supplementary aids and
services to avoid any need for removal from regular
classes.15

Parents of children with disabilities have rights to
notice and consent and, most critically, rights to participate
in the creation of the individualized education program that
sets out the services to be delivered to the child. 16 The
parents may challenge the program or placement by
demanding an adversarial "due process hearing" and they
or the school district may appeal the result of the hearing to
court, which may hear additional evidence in order to

13. See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1411(i) (West Supp. 2008) (authorizing
appropriations). All states, the District of Columbia, and the outlying areas
participate, as does the federal government's Bureau of Indian Affairs.
14. See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1401(26) (West Supp. 2008) (defining "related
services").
15. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1412(a)(5).
16. See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1414(d) (West Supp. 2008) (requiring opportunity for
parental participation in devising individualized education program).
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decide the case. 17 The guarantee to each child with a
disability of the right to a free, appropriate education, and
the guarantee to parents of procedural rights were key
features of the 1975 Education for All Handicapped
Children Act; they demonstrate a "congressional emphasis"
on furnishing individual participation rights that would be
exercised to enforce the law's underlying obligations.18 Two
federal cases that strongly influenced Congress in its
drafting of the law upheld procedural due process claims
against exclusion from public school and equal protection
claims against denial of services to children with
disabilities in public schools. 19
Parents of children with disabilities spent years
organizing and courting allies to secure passage of the
Education for All Handicapped Children Act. 20 Although
some states and local school districts had long given
services to children with disabilities and received limited
federal special education reimbursement, as of 1975
approximately 1.75 million children with disabilities were
excluded from public school and 2.5 million were in
programs that did not meet their needs. 21 In 1990, Congress
renamed the Education for All Handicapped Children Act
the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, and that is
the name the law has today. 22 The most recent amendments
17. 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1415(f)-(i) (West Supp. 2008). States may create a
hearing review procedure that must be exhausted before the matter goes to
court. § 1415(g). The child remains in the existing placement during the
pendency of proceedings. § 1415(j). Attorneys' fees are available to parents if
they are successful. § 1415(i)(3)(B)-(F). The law also provides rights to challenge
long-term suspensions, expulsions, or other removals from school imposed on
children with disabilities. § 1415(k).
18. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 205-06 (1982).
19. Mills v. Bd. of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972); Pa. Ass'n for
Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971), 343 F.
Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972). The Supreme Court commented on the importance of
these cases to the formation of the Education for All Handicapped Children Act
in Rowley, 458 U.S. at 192-93.
20. See ROBERTA WEINER & MAGGIE HUME.... AND EDUCATION FOR ALL 15-21
(2d ed. 1987).
21. H.R. REP. No. 94-332, at 11-12 (1975).
22. Pub. L. No. 101-476, § 901(a), 104 Stat. 1103, 1141-42 (1990). The term
"handicapped" had become disfavored, and many in the disabilities rights
movement favored placing the noun "person" or "individual" first and the "with
disabilities" modifier later, in order to emphasize that a person with a disability
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are
the
Individuals
with
Disabilities
Education
Improvement Act of 2004,23 often referred to as the "2004
Reauthorization."
II. ELIGIBILITY UNDER IDEA
The topic of eligibility under the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act embraces the questions of what
the statutory provisions are and how they work.
Understanding eligibility law also entails discussion of why
the eligibility provisions are there in the first place and
what direction, if any, they might be expected to go in the
future. For reasons to be explained, the provisions
themselves are surprisingly complex, but there is some
justification for their existence, even their complexity.
Various long-term trends might be expected to diminish the
importance of the eligibility provisions, but other recent
developments have instead created what will be described
as the IDEA eligibility mess.
A. What Constitutes Eligibility Under IDEA?
Children with disabilities are eligible for services under
the Act if they meet age standards, 24 have a condition listed
in the statute, and by reason of the condition, need "special
education and related services." The conditions set forth in
IDEA are:

is a human being rather than a manifestation of an impairment. ILLINOIS
ATTORNEY GENERAL, DISABILITY RIGHTS: MANUAL OF STYLE FOR DEPICTING
PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES,

http://www.ag.state.il.us/rights/manualstyle.htm

(last visited Aug. 4, 2008).

23. Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004, Pub.
L. No. 108-446, 118 Stat. 2647 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 14001482 (West Supp. 2008)). See generally Mark C. Weber, Reflections on the New

Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act, 58 FLA. L. REV. 7
(2006) (describing and commenting on 2004 Reauthorization).
24. Generally speaking, the age range is three through twenty-one. 20
U.S.C.A. § 1412(a)(1)(B) (West Supp. 2008). Children within the age range lose
coverage if they have received a regular high school diploma. 34 C.F.R.
§ 300.102(a)(3)(i) (2008). Children who are in adult prisons are also subject to
possible exclusion. § 1412(a)(1)(B)(ii). See generally Paul M. Secunda, Mediating

the Special Education Front Lines in Mississippi, 76 UMKC L. REV.
(forthcoming 2008) (describing first-hand experience of mediating special
education dispute in state detention facility for children adjudicated as adults).
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mental retardation, hearing impairments (including deafness),
speech or language impairments, visual impairments (including
blindness), serious emotional disturbance (referred to.
. as
"emotional disturbance"), orthopedic impairments, autism,
traumatic brain injury, other health impairments, or specific
learning disabilities .... 25

The statute defines some of these terms. For example, a
specific learning disability is "a disorder in 1 or more of the
basic psychological processes involved in understanding or
in using language, spoken or written, which disorder may
manifest itself in the imperfect ability to listen, think,
speak, read, write, spell, or do mathematical calculations,"
including "such conditions as perceptual disabilities, brain
injury, minimal
brain dysfunction,
dyslexia,
and
developmental aphasia. '2 6 The federal regulations provide
further definitions of the listed conditions. 27 That a child
has a listed condition is not the sole criterion for eligibility
for services under the Act. The child must by reason 28of the
condition need special education and related services.
Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)
and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 also affect
eligibility for education adapted to the needs of children
who have disabilities by providing these children with
protection from disability discrimination. The persons
covered under the two laws are those who have a physical
or mental impairment that substantially limits a major life
activity, or a record of such an impairment, or are regarded
as having such an impairment. 29 Duties under section 504
25. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1401(3)(A)(i) (West Supp. 2008). A child aged three
through nine may be eligible on the basis of having "developmental delays, as
defined by the State and as measured by appropriate diagnostic instruments
and procedures, in one or more of the following areas: physical development;
cognitive development; communication development; social or emotional
development; or adaptive development." § 1401(3)(B)(i) (West Supp. 2008).
26. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1401(30)(A)-(B) (West Supp. 2008).
27. 34 C.F.R. § 300.8.
28. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1401(3)(A)(ii).
29. 29 U.S.C.A. § 705(20)(B) (West 1999), amended by ADA Amendments
Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3533; 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(2) (West
2000), amended by ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122
Stat. 3533; 34 C.F.R. § 104.30) (2008). Section 504 is found at 29 U.S.C.A. § 794
(West 1999); title II of the ADA, which covers state and local government,
including public schools, is found at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12131-12150 (West 2000).
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and the ADA include the obligation not to segregate nor to
deny equal opportunity, 30 as well as the requirements to
accommodate and to provide a free, appropriate public
education. 31 These duties apply to units of state and local
government (under ADA Title II), such as public schools,
and entities that receive federal funding (under32 section
504), including all public and some private schools.
B. Why Identify Children as Eligible?
The earliest federal efforts to assist the education of
persons with disabilities included definitions of which
children were eligible for services, 33 and these provisions
conformed to understandings of disability that were current
30. See 34 C.F.R. § 104.4(b)(1)(i)-(ii) (may not deny the opportunity to
participate); § 104.4(b)(1)(iv) (may not provide separate benefits or services
unless necessary to furnish equally effective benefits or services).
31. 34 C.F.R. § 104.33 (requiring provision of free, appropriate public
education).
32. For a discussion of the interplay between the ADA and section 504, see
Mark C. Weber, DisabilityDiscriminationby State and Local Government: The
Relationship Between Section 504 of the RehabilitationAct and Title II of the
Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1089 (1995).
33. Education Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-380, § 101(a)(2)(E), 88
Stat. 484, 488-91 ("A State agency which is directly responsible for providing
free public education for handicapped children (including mentally retarded,
hard of hearing, deaf, speech impaired, visually handicapped, seriously
emotionally disturbed, crippled, or other health impaired children who by
reason thereof require special education), shall be eligible to receive a grant
under this section for any fiscal year.") (repealed 1978); Education of the
Handicapped Act, Pub. L. No. 91-230, § 602(1), 84 Stat. 175 (1970) ("The term
'handicapped children' means mentally retarded, hard of hearing, deaf, speech
impaired, visually handicapped, seriously emotionally disturbed, crippled, or
other health impaired children who by reason thereof require special education
and related services.") (repealed 2004); Elementary and Secondary Education
Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-750, § 602, 80 Stat. 1191, 1204 (1966) ("As
used in this title, the term 'handicapped children' includes mentally retarded,
hard of hearing, deaf, speech impaired, visually handicapped, seriously
emotionally disturbed, crippled, or other health impaired children who by
reason thereof require special education and related services.") (repealed 1970).
State and local provisions also employed categorical definitions. See Rudolf V.
Womack, A Survey of Relevant Problems in Administering a Program of Special
Education for the Cook County Argo-Evergreen Park, Reavis, Oak Lawn Special
Education District 15-27 (June 1969) (unpublished master's thesis, DePaul
University) (on file with Richardson Library, DePaul University) (describing
categories then employed by state board of education and local school district
pursuant to state law).
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among education professionals at the time. 34 The drafters of
the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975the direct ancestor of IDEA-followed the practice of using
diagnostic labels for eligibility. 35 One authoritative source
reports that use of categorizing labels had come under
attack by the time Congress considered the Act, but
explains that the advocates who lobbied for the law were
organized
by various disability groups, such as
organizations concerned with blindness, deafness, physical
disabilities, and so on. 36 Most of these groups were more
preoccupied with obtaining services by use of the disability
label than they were with any stigma the label might
carry. 37 The advocacy groups acted in a grand coalition,
which muted the voices of some advocates for persons with
mental retardation about the disadvantages of labeling. 38
Reasons for an eligibility standard, specifically one that
employs medical-diagnostic categories, include funding
allocation, imposition of limits on costs, and possible
connections between diagnoses and methods of instruction.
1. Allocating Resources. The first and most obvious
reason to define the class of children with disabilities for
purposes of federal and state law is so that members of
Congress can be certain the amounts they are
appropriating for special education will actually serve

34. Professional sources display what from the present remove seems to be a
near-obsession with definition and categorization. See EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN
IN THE SCHOOLS 8 (Lloyd M. Dunn ed., 2d ed. 1973) ("By 1950, 12 types of
exceptional children had been delineated: (1) gifted, (2) educable mentally
retarded, (3) trainable mentally retarded, (4) emotionally disturbed, (5) socially
maladjusted, (6) speech impaired, (7) deaf, (8) hard of hearing, (9) blind, (10)
partially seeing, (11) crippled, and (12) chronic health cases."); ROMAINE P.
MACKIE, SPECIAL EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES: STATISTICS 1948-1966 (1969)
(reporting statistics on children served in special education by disability
category); Womack, supra note 33. One prominent author traces this attitude to
the movement at the beginning of the twentieth century to make schools more
businesslike and the development of standardized testing during the same
period. David L. Kirp, Schools as Sorters: The Constitutional and Policy
Implications of Student Classification, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 705, 714-15 (1973).

35. Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142,
§ 4(a), 89 Stat. 773, 775 (1975) (repealed 2004).
36. Leslie Ward & Virginia Abernethy, Background, Enactment, and
Implementation of P.L. 94-142, 60 PEABODY J. EDUC. 1, 10-12 (1983).

37. Id. at 11-12.
38. Id. at 11.
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children with disabilities rather than be lost in the much
larger general education efforts of the districts that receive
the money. 39 The original grant of federal funding for
special education, after defining "handicapped children"
covered under the law, required grantees to submit state
plans, and warned:
The plan must provide satisfactory assurance that funds paid to
the State under this title will be expended, either directly or
through local educational agencies, solely to initiate, expand, or
improve programs and projects, including preschool programs and
projects ....

which are designed to meet the special educational

and related needs of handicapped
State ....40

children

throughout

the

The law also contained a nonsupplanting provision, by
which states had to guarantee that the federal funds would
supplement, and in no instance supplant, state, local, and
private expenditures for the education of the children
defined in the statute. 41 Provisions restricting expenditures
to educational services for children with disabilities
and
42
prohibiting supplanting continue to this day.
In keeping with these provisions, the funding formula
under the Education of All Handicapped Children Act
allocated money to states based on their count of children
with disabilities being provided special education and

39. Criticism may be made of existing accountability structures despite the
legal requirement that money must be spent only on eligible children. See Jeri
D. Barclay, Fiscal Accountability Under the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act: How Do We Ensure the Money Is Spent on Handicapped
Education and Related Services?, 28 J.L. & EDUC. 327, 329 (1999) ("Because
there are, in general, no accountability procedures in place for overseeing and
checking the expenditures of school systems, it is possible that the money
designated for handicapped students is often spent on other 'more important'
things, like football goal posts, new lockers, televisions, and bonuses for school
board members.").
40. Elementary and Secondary Education Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. No.
89-750, § 604(a), 80 Stat. 1191, 1205 (1966) (repealed 1970).
41. § 604(d), 80 Stat. at 1206.
42. See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1412(a)(17)(c) (West Supp. 2008) (prohibiting statelevel supplanting of expenditures); 20 U.S.C.A. § 1413(a)(2)(a) (West Supp.
2008) (restricting local school district use of funding and prohibiting local-level
supplanting of expenditures).
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related services. 43 The current formula for distribution,
adopted in the 1997 IDEA Amendments, uses that amount
for the state's baseline, but allocates increases in funding
since 1999 on a formula that relies on the number of
children (not the number of children with disabilities) aged
three through twenty-one if the state guarantees free,
appropriate public education to children with disabilities of
those ages, with a boost for the state's relative population of
children in poverty. 44 The amounts are to be passed through
to local school districts under the pre-1997 Act childrenwith-disabilities-count baseline, with increases since 1999
allocated on the school-aged population of the district, again
with a supplement for the relative population of children in
poverty. 45 Effectively, the count of children with disabilities
was frozen, and increases in funding tied to increases in the
general population of school-aged children and the
prevalence of poverty in the state. Under the current
version of IDEA, a given child need not actually receive a
specific disability category label in order to be given
federally funded special education services, but states must
report children by disability category for statistical
purposes and the child must be a child with a disability

43. Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142,
§ 5(a), 89 Stat. 773, 776 (1975) (repealed 2004).
44. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1411(d)(2)-(3) (West Supp. 2008). Other language
pertaining to the additional funding guarantees against grant decreases and
establishes maximum and minimum grants. § 1411(d)(3)(B). The contingency of
decreased federal funding is also addressed. § 1411(d)(4). A limit on the count of
children for federal special education funding to no more than 12% of the
school-aged population in the state was repealed when Congress changed the
funding formula. § 1411(a)(5) (repealed 1997).
45. § 1411(f)(2) (West 2008). Evidence suggesting that child disability
category counts are inconsistent among states led the Department of Education
to press for this change. See The IDEA Improvement Act of 1997: Hearing on
H.R. 5 Before the Subcomm. on Early Childhood, Youth and Families of the H.
Comm. on Educ. and the Workforce, 105th Cong. 60 (1997) [hereinafter
Hearings] (statement of Thomas R. Bloom, Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep't of Educ.)
("Representatives from all ten of the independent organizations with whom we
spoke corroborated our conclusion that the states differed significantly in the
proportion of children they counted in the various disability categories."). The
sponsors of the 1997 legislation made the change to eliminate incentives for
identifying children with disabilities without sufficient justification. See H. REP.
No. 105-95, at 88 (1997) ("The Committee developed the change in [funding]
formula to address the problem of over-identification of children with
disabilities.").
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under the statute. 46 Many states continue to use the count
of children with disabilities 47 in distributing state special
education funding.48
2. Limiting IDEA Costs. A second reason to define
children with disabilities and limit funded services to that
class is to set an outside limit on costs borne by the federal
and state governments. The use of the category of children
with disabilities as an eligibility criterion operates to limit
the number of children who can claim entitlement to a free,
appropriate public education and thus contribute to that
cost. Without some limit on the number of such children,
the maximum financial exposure for educating children
with disabilities would be infinity. Because of the federal
funding formula changes in the 1997 IDEA Amendments,
the eligibility standards that limit the number of children
deemed to be children with disabilities are a decreasingly
significant federal cost control, 49 but past application of the

46. See Marcia C. Arceneaux, The System and Label of Special Education:
Is It a Constitutional Issue?, 32 S.U. L. REV. 225, 239 (2005) ("Federal law
mandates that a child must qualify for special education services, thereby
receiving this broad label, before receiving the second 'descriptive category'
label (e.g., mildly mentally disabled). The descriptive categorical label is not a
mandate by law. However, in practice, the categorical labeling is commonly
used within the special education system for national consistency of data."); see
also 20 U.S.C.A. § 1418(a)(1)(A) (reporting requirements).
47. Some states use proxies for the count of identified children. These
proxies include weighting formulas that allocate set amounts for the assumed
extra cost of educating each child in a given disability category, as well as
resource-based models, which allocate funding based on teacher and related
service personnel count. See generally THOMAS PARRISH ET AL., STATE SPECIAL
EDUCATION FINANCE SYSTEMS, 1999-2000, at 3-11 (2003) (describing set types of
state financing systems and compiling survey data on their prevalence).
48. See Thomas Parrish, Disparities in the Identification, Funding, and
Provisionof Special Education,in RACIAL INEQUITY IN SPECIAL EDUCATION 15, 18
(Daniel J. Losen & Gary Orfield, eds. 2002) ("[Miost . . . states have more
generic systems providing funding based on the number of students receiving
special education services or on general enrollment."); id at 29 (identifying
twenty-four of twenty-eight surveyed states as linking funding for local school
districts to counts of children with disabilities being served by district).
49. Moreover, the federal financial exposure is restricted by the statute and
capped by appropriations. The maximum federal funding that may be awarded
under IDEA is 40% of the average cost of educating a child without disabilities
for each child receiving special education. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1411(a)(2) (West Supp.
2008). Congress has never actually appropriated enough funds to provide
support for states and school districts at the maximum level under IDEA.
Instead, allocations are ratably reduced to meet appropriations. See
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standards constitutes the baseline for allocation of most of
the federal funding and so continues to exert budgetary
force. 50 Moreover, definitional limits on children's eligibility
control allocations of state and local dollars based on child
5
count. 1
3. Creating Instructional Categories. Reason number
three has to do with instruction. Identification, specifically
identification by category, traditionally has been thought to
be needed in order to determine what services should be
provided to children. 52 Doubts have emerged concerning
this link between identification and instruction, with the
result that more and more educators question the value of
rigid disability-category classification. 53 It remains true,
however, that much support for special education
legislation comes from professional and parental groups
that are organized by disability category or services

§ 1411(d)(2)-(3). The federal participation varies from year to year, but it tends
to range just above 10%. See Hearings, supra note 45, at 103 (testimony of
George W. Severns, Jr., Superintendent, Dover Area Sch. Dist.). The
definitional limit on which children may be claimed for the maximum amount of
funding in the statute keeps the gap between aspiration and reality from being
limitless. Full funding, i.e., funding to the maximum amount, is a perennial
hope of many special education advocates and their congressional allies. See,
e.g., IDEA Full Funding Act, S. 2185, 109th Cong. (2006); Full Funding for
IDEA Now Act of 2005, H.R. 1107, 109th Cong. (2005).
50. One authority testifying regarding the 1997 legislation opposed relaxing
the standards for the category of developmental delay on the ground that it
would raise the child count and increase costs. Hearings, supra note 45, at 8384 (testimony of Lou Barela, Dir., Upper Solano County Special Educ. Local
Plan Area).
51. See supra text accompanying notes 49-50.
52. See S. REP. No. 94-168, at 27 (1975) ("[Ildentification and labelling of...
handicapping conditions . . . is a necessary tool for designing appropriate
instruction."); LAURA F. ROTHSTEIN, SPECIAL EDUCATION LAW 93 (1990) ("It is
necessary to identify children who have special needs and to identify what type
of programming is appropriate.").
53. See, e.g., NAT'L ASS'N OF SCH. PSYCHOLOGISTS, NASP POSITION STATEMENT ON
RIGHTS WITHOUT LABELS 1 (2002), http://www.nasponline.org/about-nasp/
positionpapers/rwl.pdf [hereinafter NASP POSITION STATEMENT] ("Contrary to
commonly held assumptions, research indicates that . . . [p]articularly among
the more subjective, 'mild' disability categories of Specific Learning Disability,
Mental
Retardation,
Emotional
Disturbance,
and
Speech/Language
Impairment, labeled students show significant overlap in skills and receive
highly similar instruction.").
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associated with a particular type of disability. 54 The support
may thus survive its
for specific categorical definition
55
demonstrated educational value.
C. A DiminishingRole for Special Education Eligibility?
The limited, and to some degree diminishing, value of
the reasons for insisting on eligibility by disability
classification dovetails with the reforms in special
education law over the past dozen years. The absence of a
clear link to instruction and the removal of a direct tie
between eligible-child count and federal funding might be
expected to cause a further deemphasis on the eligibility
issue. That expectation is in turn reinforced by
amendments to IDEA in 1997 and 2004, as well as a greater
orientation towards disability accommodations in other
laws. Even the accountability movement in general
education has blurred the line between children eligible for
special education and other children by causing children not
designated as IDEA-eligible to receive specialized
instruction to boost test scores and supplemental
for attending
services to compensate
educational
underperforming schools.
The 1997 IDEA Amendments took a major step toward
reducing reliance on disability categories by taking the
category of "experiencing developmental delays," which had
previously been used only for pre-schoolers, and permitting

54. See H. REP. No. 108-77, at 78-80 (2003) (listing witnesses for various
congressional proposals to amend IDEA from 2001-03). It should be noted,
however, that a large number of witnesses in support of recent legislation have
been academic experts, school district officials, and leaders of cross-disability
organizations. Cf. Ward & Abernethy, supra note 36, at 10-11 (noting high
degree of disability-category affiliation of supporters of 1975 special education
legislation).
55. See Sharon Weitzman Soltman & Donald R. Moore, Ending Segregation

of Chicago's Students with Disabilities:Implications of the Corey H. Lawsuit, in
supra note 48, at 239, 250 (noting
opposition to change by proponents of existing Illinois system of special
education "tightly organized around specific disability categories based on the
view that disabilities could be identified with precision and that each disability
could best be 'treated' by a specialist in that disability working solely with
students who 'had' that particular disability").
RACIAL INEQUITY IN SPECIAL EDUCATION,
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it to be used for children all the way up through age nine. 56
The term is defined broadly to include delays in physical
development,
cognitive
development,
communication
development, social or emotional development, or adaptive
development.5 7 Effectively, the law allows a child up
through age nine to be identified as disabled without any
specification of the child's disability. 58
The 2004 Reauthorization makes a number of changes
that affect special education eligibility and may decrease its
significance. The new law allows a school district to use up
to 15% of its federal special education funding for early
intervening services for children who have not been
formally identified as needing special education but who
nevertheless need additional academic and behavioral
support to succeed in the general education environment. 59
Congress adopted this provision in response to the view of
the members of the President's Commission on Excellence
in Special Education and others who believed that waiting
to determine eligibility before providing educational
assistance amounts to waiting for children to fail and
unnecessarily segregates children with disabilities from the
general education population. 60 Significantly, under this
law federal special education funding directly benefits
students who have never been-and, if the program is
successful, perhaps never will be-identified as students
with disabilities. The 2004 Reauthorization also provides
that state educational agencies must permit school districts
to use methods for determining a learning disability other
than the discrepancy between a student's intellectual
ability and achievement. 6 1 This change responds to
criticism of IQ testing, and may reflect doubts over the
56. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments of 1997, Pub.
L. No. 105-17, § 602(3)(B)(i), 111 Stat. 37, 42-43 (1997) (codified at 20 U.S.C.A. §
1401(3)(B) (West Supp. 2008)).
57. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1401(3)(B)(i).
58. This reality led to opposition on the ground that too many children
might obtain the classification and thus an entitlement to services. See supra
note 52 and accompanying text.
59. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1413(f).
60. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON EXCELLENCE IN SPECIAL EDUCATION, A NEW
ERA: REVITALIZING SPECIAL EDUCATION FOR CHILDREN AND THEIR FAMILIES 7
(2002).
61. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1414(b)(6)(A) (West Supp. 2008).
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meaningfulness of the learning disabilities designation both
in itself and in distinction from other categories of disability
that have a negative impact on the learning process. 62 The
federal regulations provide that states must permit districts
to use a process for determining learning disability that is
"based on the63child's response to scientific, research-based
intervention."
As noted above with regard to eligibility standards in
general, the federal special education law operates against
the background of a separate law barring disability
discrimination in all federally funded activity, section 504
of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.64 Another law, the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, reinforces the
nondiscrimination duty for school districts and other units
of state and local government. 65 Under these statutes,
children who have a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits a major life activity must receive
66
reasonable accommodations from public school systems.
Although the vast majority of these children will also be
eligible under IDEA, some may obtain services as
accommodations without ever going through the special
education eligibility process, and still others might be found
ineligible under IDEA because they do not meet the
specifics of an IDEA eligibility category or do not need
special education and related services despite their

62. See Weber, supra note 23, at 26-27 (collecting sources). See generally
infra text accompanying notes 196-99 (exploring criticisms of learning disability
designation).
63. 34 C.F.R. § 300.307(a)(2) (2008). The Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for
the regulations contains language critical of the discrepancy-based model for
learning disabilities determinations and praises the RTI alternative. Additional
Procedures for Evaluating Children With Specific Disabilities, 70 Fed. Reg.
35,802 (June 21, 2005).
64. 29 U.S.C.A. § 794 (West 1999).
65. See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12131-12150 (West 2005) (covering state and local
government services). See generally Weber, supra note 32, at 1101-02
(discussing relationship between section 504 and ADA).
66. 29 U.S.C.A. § 794, 42 U.S.C.A. § 12132. These laws cover individuals
whose condition meets the definition described in the text, as well as those with
a record of such an impairment and those regarded as having such an
impairment. 29 U.S.C.A. § 705(20)(B) (West 1999 & Supp. 2008) (definition
applicable to section 504), 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(2) (West 2005) (definition
applicable to ADA title II).
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disabling conditions. 67 The practice of providing limited
accommodations and failing to give fuller special education
services to some of these children has caused conflicts, 68 but
the availability of the services under non-IDEA auspices
may decrease the need to find children IDEA-eligible in
certain cases.
In reality, specialized educational services for public
school children are by no means a monopoly of the special
education system. The accountability standards embodied
in the student achievement goals of the No Child Left
Behind (NCLB) initiative contemplate
significantly
enhanced services to children who are at risk of low
achievement so that they rise up to performance levels set
by the state.6 9 Children in schools that are failing to make
adequate yearly progress must be offered supplemental
educational services-essentially, tutoring-from providers
67. See MARK C. WEBER, RALPH MAWDSLEY & SARAH REDFIELD, SPECIAL
EDUCATION LAw: CASES AND MATERIALS 59 (2d ed. 2007). An example would be a
child with an orthopedic impairment who has completed the high school
physical education requirement.
68. Compare Hood v. Encinitas Union Sch. Dist., 486 F.3d 1099 (9th Cir.
2007) (affirming denial of IDEA eligibility for child receiving accommodations
under section 504) with Mr. I. v. Me. Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 55, 480 F.3d 1 (1st
Cir. 2007) (overturning denial of IDEA eligibility for child afforded services
under section 504).
69. See generally No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115
Stat. 1425 (2002) (codified at 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 6301-6320, 7801-7803 (West Supp.
2008)); Perry A. Zirkel, NCLB: What Does It Mean for Students with
Disabilities?, 185 Educ. L. Rep. 805, 805-12 (2004) (outlining NCLB collective
goals for achievement by students). Some commentators are highly negative
about NCLB, see, e.g., Thomas Rentschler, No Child Left Behind: Admirable
Goals, Disastrous Outcomes, 12 WIDENER L. REV. 637 (2006), but others are at
least guardedly optimistic, see, e.g., Weber, supra note 23, at 20-21, 51; Chester
E. Finn, Jr., 5 Myths About the Education Law Everyone Loves to Hate, WASH.
POST, Mar. 30, 2008, at B3. The ultimate effect of NCLB on IDEA eligibility
remains unpredictable, but there is some reason to believe that, for better or
worse, it may diminish the number of children in special education. If
successful, the NCLB program may lead to improvements in general education
that decrease the need for children to be served by the special education system.
Unfortunately, NCLB may also lead to school officials artificially limiting the
number of children in special education so that their testing results are not
viewed as statistically significant. See Weber, supra, at 22 & n.76 (collecting
sources); see also Richard C. Herrera, Note, Policing State Testing Under No
Child Left Behind: EncouragingStudents with Disabilitiesto Blow the Whistle
on Unscrupulous Educators, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 1433 (2007) (discussing various
forms of educator misconduct with regard to testing of students with
disabilities).
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other than their public schools. 70 Title I remedial
educational services are available to children in schools
with high numbers or high percentages of impoverished
students, and nearly fifteen million students receive
assistance under this program. 71 States and school districts
must cooperate 72with the NCLB program or they will lose
Title I funding.
The confluence of all these developments could result in
what I have elsewhere termed "not-quite-so-special
education." 73 In the current context, that would mean large
numbers of children receiving the specialized services and
accommodations they need under any number of different
programs, without much emphasis on the label of the child
or the name of the program, but with careful attention to
the goal of having all children thrive in the mainstream of
public education. 74 But instead, conflicts have emerged as
70. 20 U.S.C.A. § 6316(e) (West Supp. 2008). See generally U.S. DEP'T OF
EDUC., POLICY AND PROGRAM STUDIES SERVICE, REPORT HIGHLIGHTS, EARLY
IMPLEMENTATION OF SUPPLEMENTAL EDUCATIONAL SERVICES UNDER THE No
CHILD LEFT BEHIND ACT (2002), http://www.ed.gov/rschstat/eval/disadv/

supplementalyearl/highlights.pdf.
71. See 20 U.S.C.A. § 6301 (West 2003) (statement of purpose); U.S. DEP'T OF
EDUC., FACT SHEET ON TITLE I, PART A (Aug. 2002), http://www.ed.gov/rschstat/
eval/disadv/titlel-factsheet.pdf (providing statistical information on Title I
program). See generally STEPHANIE STULLICH ET AL., POLICY AND PROGRAM STUDIES
SERV., OFFICE OF PLANNING, EVAL. AND POLICY DEV., NATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF TITLE
I, FINAL REPORT
(Oct. 2007), http://ies.ed.gov/ncee/pdf/20084012_rev.pdf

(discussing title I program's longitudinal impact).
72. See 20 U.S.C.A. § 6311 (West 2003) (establishing conditions for funding).
The impact of this use of the spending power on constitutional concerns has
received scholarly attention. E.g., Rentschler, supra note 69, at 639-53 (noting
federalism-based objections to NCLB); Note, No Child Left Behind and the
Political Safeguards of Federalism, 119 HARv. L. REV. 885, 897-900 (2006)
(discussing constitutional concerns with regard to funding conditions in NCLB).
73. Weber, supranote 23, at 51.
74. Other observers detected convergence between general education and
special education as early as the late 1980s and early 1990s. See James A.
Tucker & Jeffrey F. Champagne, Where's the War? A Response to Meredith and
Underwood, 25 J.L. & EDUC. 447, 448 (1996) ("[T]here has been a steady
movement toward the integration of special-education philosophy into the
regular classrooms of America."); see also id. at 451 ("As the field struggles
toward reform for all students, terms such as inclusiveness and
individualization are not just for special education any more. For reasons
having little to do with disabilities, schools are experimenting with outcomebased and outcome-paced progressions that do not presume the existence of a
mainstream.") (footnote omitted). Some sources note a potential for greater
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school districts try to keep children from attaining the
eligibility status for IDEA, a status that, unlike being
served under section 504, NCLB, or Title I, gives the
children clear rights to appropriate education and gives
their parents explicit procedural protections to enforce
those rights. These eligibility conflicts are the first partbut only one part--of the IDEA eligibility mess.
III. THE IDEA ELIGIBILITY MESS
A certain amount of disorder may always be present in
legal regimes that address complex social problems. 75 But
even within the all-too-arcane field of special education law,
the topic of IDEA eligibility is messy indeed. The reasons
for that condition, and the components of the current
confusion over special education eligibility are three: a
series of recent cases, many oddly and indefensibly
restricting children's IDEA eligibility; a longstanding
dissatisfaction with methods of evaluating children for
learning disabilities, matched by a not-fully-proven but
hard-sold methodological response; and a well-founded
concern over racial overrepresentation in some IDEA
eligibility categories, met with anxiety over what to do
about it.
A. Recent Contested Cases, Many IrrationallyRestricting
Eligibility
Some of the current problems with special education
eligibility stem from judicial decisions that read the
eligibility provisions extremely narrowly. A number of these
cases divide up the provisions and then use caselaw
relating to a different topic, the proper level of special
education services, or use state law, in order to give the
terms restrictive readings. Other cases rely on an oddly
worded regulation
supposedly
distinguishing
social

convergence but believe it has not yet been fulfilled. See Arceneaux, supra note
46, at 245-46 (proposing that services for all children be provided within single
system of education); NASP POSITION STATEMENT, supra note 53, at 6 (proposing
"noncategorical models of service delivery").
75. For an interesting discussion of this topic in connection with law
regarding civil procedure, see Janice Toran, 'Tis a Gift to be Simple: Aesthetics
and ProceduralReform, 89 MICH. L. REV. 352 (1990).
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maladjustment from emotional disturbance to exclude
children with behavior disorders from eligibility under
IDEA. The approaches taken in these decisions have scant
justification but significant effects in muddying the
eligibility waters.
1. Cases Parsing the Eligibility Provisions, Misusing
Rowley, and Relying on State Law. The eligibility provisions
in the federal law can be broken down into three
components.7 6 First, there has to be one of the specified
disabling conditions; 77 second, for all of these but specific
learning disabilities, which appears to have the term
implied, there must be an adverse effect on educational
performance; 78 and third, the child, by reason of the
disabling condition, must need special education and
related services. 79 What appears to be most newsworthy in
recent decisions applying these eligibility provisions is the
courts' strict parsing of them, the use of Board of Education
v. Rowley8 0 in interpreting one or all of the terms, and the
application of state law to questions about the terms'
interpretation.
A recent opinion applying these approaches to the case
of a child with learning disabilities8 l is Hood v. Encinitas
Union School District.8 2 Hood involved a fifth-grader who
had average to above average grades and test scores, but
76. Garda, supranote 9, at 457-58.
77. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1401(3)(A)(i) (West Supp. 2008). Children aged three
through nine with developmental delays are treated somewhat differently. See
34 C.F.R. § 300.8(b) (2008).
78. 34 C.F.R. § 300.8(c)(1)-(13).
79. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1401(3)(A)(ii).
80. 458 U.S. 176 (1982).
81. The empirical research of Professor Zirkel suggests that relatively few
special education disputes hinge on eligibility under the heading of specific
learning disability, and that school districts prevail in the overwhelming
majority of the cases, typically by showing that the discrepancy between ability
and achievement is not severe enough. PERRY A. ZIRKEL, THE LEGAL MEANING OF
SPECIFIC LEARNING DIsABILITY FOR SPECIAL EDUCATION ELIGIBILITY 46-70 (rev.

ed. 2006). The small number of cases contrasts with their mighty impact on the
confusion over IDEA eligibility. For a thoughtful discussion of Professor Zirkel's
study, see Paul M. Secunda, 'At Best an Inexact Science"- Delimiting the Legal
Contours of Specific Learning Disability Under IDEA, 36 J.L. & EDUC. 155
(2007) (book review) (footnote omitted in title).
82. 486 F.3d 1099 (9th Cir. 2007).
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who also had serious problems completing her work on
time, keeping her belongings organized, and finishing
tasks.8 3 The child's test scores showed occasional poor
performance but high intellectual ability.8 4 There was also
evidence of a visual impairment and a seizure disorder, and
a recommendation for evaluation for attention-deficit
disorder, which led to the child's taking medication for the
condition.8 5 The public school provided an accommodation
plan that included preferential seating, use of a graphic
organizer and keyboard, one-step directions, visual support
for instructions and concepts, frequent prompts for
understanding, and daily teacher checks on homework
assignments.86 The hearing officer agreed with the school
district that the child was not eligible under IDEA, and the
district court affirmed, relying on a state law providing that
discrepancies in performance matter only if they cannot be
corrected through other regular or categorical
services
87
offered within the regular instructional program.
The court of appeals affirmed, again relying on the
state law about discrepancies not being able to be corrected
through services offered within regular education.88 The
court tried to buttress its position with a discussion of
Board of Education v. Rowley, the first case the Supreme
Court decided under the statute that became the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, in which the
Court declared that the Act was satisfied if the school
system provided "personalized instruction with sufficient
support services to permit the child to benefit
educationally;" the Act did not require that the child's
potential be maximized.8 9 At first, the Hood court conceded
that Rowley concerned the level of required services to be
provided a child found to be eligible, not the determination

83. Id. at 1101.
84. Id. at 1101 & n.1. The child's scores on achievement tests put her above
the median almost uniformly. Id. at 1101.
85. Id. at 1101-02.
86. Id. at 1102.
87. Id. at 1103-04 (citing CAL. EDUC. CODE § 56337(c) (West 2003)).
88. Id. at 1106.
89. 458 U.S. 176, 203 (1982).
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of eligibility itself.90 After pushing the Rowley case out the
front door, however, the court invited it in the back. It
asserted that, "Just as courts look to the ability of a
disabled child to benefit from the services provided to
determine if that child is receiving an adequate special
education, it is appropriate for courts to determine if a child
classified
as
non-disabled
is
receiving
adequate
accommodations in the general classroom-and thus is not
entitled to special education services-using the benefit
standard."91 The court said that under the some-benefit
standard of Rowley and cases like it, the child's nearly
uniform record of average or above average grades showed
that she was disqualified from eligibility as a child with a
learning disability under the state provision because the
discrepancy between achievement and performance
appeared correctible in the regular classroom. 92 The court
thus (1) read a Supreme Court case concerning levels of
services to (2) place a restrictive construction on state law
dealing with commensurateness of achievement with
ability, when the state law itself (3) limited the federal
definition of learning disability by requiring that the
condition not be able to be corrected within the regular
classroom. 93 Not one of these steps has a justification in the
federal statute.
Another court of appeals case similar in its breakdown
of the eligibility provisions and use of Rowley (if not in its
reliance on state law provisions) is Alvin Independent
School District v. A.D.94 The case concerned a child with
attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) who was
dismissed from special education after third grade and
performed well through elementary school, but then began

90. Hood, 486 F.3d at 1106-07 ("[It is true that the Rowley case dealt with
the level of services that must be provided to a student already deemed eligible
for special education, rather than special education eligibility itself ....
91. Id. at 1107.
92. Id. at 1108.
93. The court also rejected the contention that the child was a child with a
disability under the category of other health impairment (OHI), saying that the
child did not need special education when accommodations could be provided in
the regular classroom, relying again on a state law provision. Id. at 1108-09
(citing CAL. EDUC. CODE § 56026(b) (West 2003)).
94. 503 F.3d 378 (5th Cir. 2007).
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exhibiting behavior problems in middle school. 95 He was
placed in an "at-risk" program, but continued to pass all his
classes and meet statewide achievement standards. 96 His
misconduct escalated to the point that in eighth grade he
engaged in theft of property and robbery of a school
concession stand, for which he was given an in-school
suspension and a recommendation for placement in an
alternative education program. 97 The child nevertheless
had satisfactory grades, with one A, three Bs, two Cs, and
one D, and passed the state achievement test, doing
particularly well in reading. 98 The district court overturned
a hearing officer decision that the child was eligible for
special education, reasoning that the child did not need
special education services by reason of his disability, and
the court of appeals affirmed. 99
The court of appeals agreed with the child's parents
that ADHD is included in the IDEA eligibility category of
other health impairment (OHI), but ruled that the child
failed to meet the second half that the IDEA eligibility
standard, that "by reason thereof, [the child] needs special
education and related services."'100 The court noted that the
child had passing grades and success on state evaluations.
It quoted language from Rowley stating that the
achievement of passing grades is an important factor in
determining educational benefit, without noting that
Rowley was referring to the level of services for a child
already found eligible rather than any part of the eligibility
standard. The court also said that the child's teachers
testified that despite his misconduct, he did not need
special education and had social success in school' 0 1 ; it
noted that there were non-ADHD-related reasons for the
misconduct, including the recent death of the student's

95. Id. at 379-80.
96. Id. at 380.

97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 381, 384.
100. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1401(3)(A) (West 2000).
101. Given the unfortunate social dynamics that often appear in middle

school, one may wonder whether the aggressive misconduct may have raised
the child's social prestige.
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baby brother and the student's abuse of alcohol. 0 2 The
court said that
any educational need was not by reason of
1
the ADHD. 03
Not every recent case has been so restrictive in its
approach to eligibility. In Mr. I. v. Maine School
Administrative District No. 55, the First Circuit Court of
Appeals held that a child with Asperger's Syndrome and
depression was a child with a disability under IDEA. 104 The
court reached its result by steering clear of Rowley, though
it could not avoid the specifics of the federal eligibility
provisions and state law definitions. Mr. I. concerned a
child who regularly missed school, engaged in selfdestructive behavior, and had trouble with peer
relationships. 10 5 Nevertheless, she had a history 0of6
performance.
academic
superior
to
adequate
Psychological testing suggested the presence of Asperger's
10 7
Syndrome and adjustment disorder with depressed mood.
The school deemed the child eligible under section 504 and
provided her a plan that furnished tutoring and social
pragmatics instruction. 108 Over the parents' objections, the
school system refused to find her eligible under IDEA, so
the parents continued a placement they had initiated for
her in a private school after she had made a suicide
attempt; they demanded tuition reimbursement from the
school district. 109 The hearing officer upheld the school

102. Alvin, 503 F.3d at 384.
103. Id. A recent district court case with some similarities to Hood and A.D.
is Ashli C. v. Hawaii, No. 05-00429 (HG-KSC), 2007 WL 247761 (D. Haw. Jan.
23, 2007), in which the court affirmed an administrative decision that a child
with ADHD receiving differentiated instruction available to all children in the
classroom failed to meet the IDEA eligibility standard because her condition did
not meet the component of the OHI definition that the condition adversely
affect educational performance. The court looked to Rowley and said that any
adverse effect did not render the child unable to learn and perform in regular
classroom without specially designed instruction. Id. at 8-10.
104. 480 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2007).
105. Id. at 6.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 7.
108. Id. at 8.
109. Id.
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district's conclusion that the child was not eligible under
IDEA, but the district court reversed that holding. 110
The court of appeals affirmed the ruling that the child
was eligible.111 The Asperger's Syndrome and mood disorder
met the list of conditions in the statute, leaving in dispute
the adverse effect on educational performance and the need
for special education by reason of the condition. 11 2 The court
observed that Maine law defined educational performance
to include "academic areas (reading, math, communication,
etc.), non-academic areas (daily life activities, mobility,
etc.), extracurricular activities, progress in meeting goals
established for the general curriculum, and performance on
State-wide and local assessments."'1 3 The court rejected the
school district's contention that educational performance
includes simply the academic areas measured and assessed
by the state or school district, and it buttressed that
reading with reference to the broad purposes of IDEA to
prepare children with disabilities for independence and
meet children's social as well as academic needs. 114
The court also pointed out that the requirement of
"adversely affects educational performance" in the federal
regulations includes any adverse effect, even if slight.
Relying on legislative history, the dictionary, and other
sources, the court rejected arguments by the school district
for a reading of the term that would require a significant

110. Id. at 9.
111. Id. at 23. It also affirmed a holding by the district court that the
parents were not entitled to tuition reimbursement, because the private school
they chose did not provide special education services, nor was the child entitled
to compensatory education, because the district court in its discretion believed
that prospective relief would be a sufficient remedy for past harm. Id. at 23-26.
For a comprehensive discussion of reimbursement remedies, see Mitchell H.

Rubinstein,

Parents as Quasi-Therapists Under the Individuals with

Disabilities EducationAct, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 899 (2008); Stephen C. Shannon,

Note, The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act: Determining
'AppropriateRelief" in a Post-Gwinnett Era, 85 VA. L. REV. 853 (1999).
112. See Mr. I. v. Me. Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 55, 480 F.3d 1, 19 (1st Cir.
2007). Precisely which statutory condition applied did not need to be resolved.

Id.
113. Id. at 11 (quoting 05-071-101 ME. CODER. § 2.7 (Weil 2006)).
114. Id. at 12-13.
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adverse impact. 115 It distinguished J.D. v. Pawlet School
District,116 a Second Circuit case, on the ground that in
concluding the child was not eligible for special education
the Second Circuit relied on a Vermont regulation that
defined adverse effect to require a determination that the
child was functioning significantly below expected age or
grade norms in one or more areas of basic skills. 117 Finally,
the court rejected the school district's argument that the
child did not need special education by reason of her
condition, stressing that both the federal and state law
definitions of special education included the social skills
118
and pragmatic language instruction the child needed.
The school district took a confusing position on the child's
meaning of the term "need," at one point arguing that need
related to benefit in the areas of educational performance
affected by the disability and at another point contending
that "need" related to the ability to do well in or benefit
from school. The court said that a child may not need
special education to do well in school in the sense of getting
high grades, but may still perform below acceptable levels
in areas such as behavior. It did not resolve the precise
meaning of the term, but found the school district's
arguments unsupported with regard to the principal point
about benefit in the areas of educational performance
adversely affected by the child's condition. 1 9
2. Social Maladjustment Cases. A topic of slightly less
prominence in recent caselaw but still a matter of
importance for special education eligibility is whether a
child's condition fits within the category of severe emotional
disturbance, or is classed instead as mere social
maladjustment and not included in the categorical
definition. "Serious emotional disturbance" is one of the
conditions that may qualify a child as a child with disability

115. Id. at 13-16. The court rejected a floodgates argument, saying that a
child would be excluded if she did not need special education by reason of the
condition, or might be excluded by the disability conditions' definitions without
reaching that question. Id. at 13-14.
116. 224 F.3d 60 (2d Cir. 2000).
117. Mr. I., 480 F.3d at 16-17.
118. Id. at 20-21.
119. Id. at 21-23.
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under IDEA, 120 and the definition of serious emotional
disturbance in paragraph 300.8(c)(4)(i) of the federal
regulations covers long-term conditions that are exhibited
"to a marked degree" and adversely affect the child's
educational performance. 121 These conditions include: the
"inability to learn that cannot be explained by intellectual,
sensory or health factors;" the "inability to build or
maintain satisfactory interpersonal relationships with
peers and teachers;" "[i]nappropriate behavior or feelings
under normal circumstances;" "[a] general, pervasive mood
of unhappiness or depression;" or "[a] tendency to develop
physical symptoms or fears associated with . . . school
problems." 122 After reciting this list, however, the
disturbance includes
states:
"Emotional
regulation
schizophrenia. The term does not apply to children who are
socially maladjusted, unless it is determined that they have
disturbance under paragraph (c)(4)(i) this
an emotional
23
section."1
The original meaning of this "socially maladjusted"
language is mysterious. 124 A leading special education

120. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1401(3)(A)(i) (West Supp. 2008). The statutory text notes
that serious emotional disturbance is "referred to in this chapter as 'emotional
disturbance."' Id. The terms will be used interchangeably here. The Supreme
Court has pointed out the historical practice of excluding children with
emotional disturbance from public school, and the importance of the federal
special education law in covering these children. Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305,
324 (1988) ("In drafting the law, Congress was largely guided by the recent
decisions in Mills v. Board of Education of District of Columbia, 348 F. Supp.
866 ([D.D.C.] 1972), and PARC [v. Pennsylvania],343 F. Supp. 279 ([E.D. Pa.]
1972), both of which involved the exclusion of hard-to-handle disabled students.
Mills in particular demonstrated the extent to which schools used disciplinary
measures to bar children from the classroom. There, school officials had labeled
four of the seven minor plaintiffs "behavioral problems," and had excluded them
from classes without providing any alternative education to them or any notice
Congress attacked such exclusionary practices in a variety
to their parents ....
of ways. It required participating States to educate all disabled children,
regardless of the severity of their disabilities, . . . and included within the
definition of "handicapped" those children with serious emotional
disturbances.").
121. 34 C.F.R. § 300.8(c)(4)(i) (2008).
122. 34 C.F.R. § 300.8(c)(4)(i)(A)-(E).
123. 34 C.F.R. § 300.8(c)(4)(ii).
124. See Weithorn, supra note 11, at 1357 ("Neither term was a diagnostic
'term of art' in the mental health or education fields prior to their use in the
legislation and regulations, and studies have revealed that those applying the
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source from the time of the drafting of the 1975 Education
for All Handicapped Children Act and the original edition of
the regulations notes that "emotionally disturbed" and
"socially maladjusted" are often used interchangeably, then
goes on to say, "The term 'socially maladjusted' is a less
noxious synonym for 'juvenile delinquent.' Its usage is
usually restricted to adolescents or preadolescents who
break the law and thus has a legal derivation."'125 The
inference is that the language about social maladjustment
was inserted simply to keep every child who is classified as
delinquent from being automatically eligible for special
education. That interpretation is reinforced by the structure
of the regulation itself. The child may meet the criteria for
emotional disturbance and be socially maladjusted, in
which case the child is eligible. It is only if the child fails to
meet the criteria of paragraph (c)(4)(i) that he or she will
not qualify as having emotional disturbance. Social
maladjustment is thus not an exception or exclusion from
the category of emotional disturbance, 126 it is simply not a
basis for emotional disturbance if it stands alone.

definition do not apply the term in a systematic or consistent matter from
setting to setting or case to case."); Moira O'Neill, Note, Delinquent or Disabled?
Harmonizing the IDEA Definition of "Emotional Disturbance" with the
Educational Needs of Incarcerated Youth, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1189, 1203 (2006)
(collecting sources indicating identical usage of terms "socially maladjusted"
and "emotionally disturbed" in materials surrounding enactment of early
federal special education legislation). A now-repealed Connecticut special
education statute combined the terms, providing a definition for the category
"socially and emotionally maladjusted" children. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-76a(i)
(1958) (repealed 1996).
125. Paul S. Graubard, Children with Behavior Disabilities,in EXCEPTIONAL
CHILDREN IN THE SCHOOLS, supra note 34, at 243, 245. The Model Penal Code

Contains a parallel provision in its language concerning the insanity defense:
(1) A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of

such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks
substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness]
of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law.
(2) As used in this Article, the terms "mental disease or defect" do not
include an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or
otherwise antisocial conduct.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (2001). Thanks to Michael Perlin for this insight.
126. Thus it makes more sense to speak of the '"socially maladjusted'
exclusionary language" than the social maladjustment exclusion. O'Neill, supra
note 124 at 1202 (using "exclusionary language" terminology).
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A number of courts interpret the social maladjustment
term as a broad exclusion, however. An illustrative decision
is Tracy v. Beaufort County Board of Education, in which a
child with asthma and other breathing difficulties engaged
in drug and alcohol abuse, was truant from school, and
manifested depression. 127 The school district found the child
eligible for IDEA services under the other health impaired
category, but the parent argued that he was also
emotionally disturbed, and thus that the school district
should pay for a private placement they undertook to
address the emotional difficulties he was experiencing. 128
The court affirmed a state review officer's decision that the
child was not eligible under the emotional disturbance
category, declaring: "During the time that Sean was
enrolled in public school, he engaged in unruly conduct,
such as alcohol and drug abuse, but there was no indication
that this conduct was the result of anything other than
social maladjustment."'129 The court thus read social
maladjustment as a condition in itself, a disability category
distinct from emotional disturbance. The court did go on to
discuss whether the child met the qualifying characteristics
of paragraph (c)(4)(i) and ultimately concluded that he did
not, and that emotional disturbance did not cause an
adverse effect on his education. 30 Although the latter
considerations indicate that the court would have reached
the same result had it read the regulation's language about
social maladjustment correctly, the treatment of social
maladjustment as something distinct from emotional
disturbance is troubling.
Tracy is a lineal descendent of Springer v. Fairfax
County School Board, which it relied on and quoted at
length. 131 In Springer, a child who had been successful in

127. 335 F. Supp. 2d 675 (D.S.C. 2004).
128. See id. at 688. As noted above, there is no necessary connection
between the eligibility category under which the child qualifies and the services
the child is entitled to receive, but the parties and the court operated under the
assumption that there was.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 689.
131. 134 F.3d 659 (4th Cir. 1998). See Tracy, 335 F. Supp. 2d at 688-89
(quoting Springer, 134 F.3d at 664-66).
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school developed behavior problems in eleventh grade. 132
He was convicted of possession of burglary tools and
tampering with a car, stayed out all night, stole from his
parents and others, and used marijuana and alcohol. 133 His
offenses at school included absenteeism, driving recklessly
on school property, forgery, leaving school grounds without
134
permission, fighting, and stealing another student's car.
His absenteeism, failure to complete assignments, and
failure to show up for final exams caused him to fail three
of seven courses for the year. 135 His parents enrolled him in
a private residential school and requested public school
funding on the ground that he was a child with emotional
disturbance and needed the placement to learn. 136 The
school contended that his behavior manifested a conduct
disorder, but not emotional disturbance. 137 Although a local
hearing officer ruled that the child was IDEA-eligible as
emotionally disturbed, a state review138officer reversed and
the district court affirmed that ruling.
The court of appeals affirmed, stating that the child
was socially maladjusted, defined as engaging in
"'continued misbehavior outside acceptable norms."' 13 9 The
court relied on the child's diagnoses of conduct disorder,
1 40
which it found to be consistent with social maladjustment.
It then asserted that "the regulatory framework under
IDEA pointedly carves out 'socially maladjusted' behavior
from the definition of serious emotional disturbance." 141 It
continued: "This exclusion makes perfect sense when one
considers the population targeted by the statute. Teenagers,
for instance, can be a wild and unruly bunch. Adolescence
is, almost by definition, a time of social maladjustment for

132. Springer, 134 F.3d at 661.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 661-62.
138. Id. at 662.
139. Id. at 664 (quoting local hearing officer decision).
140. Id.
141. Id.
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many people. ' 142 Equating bad conduct with serious
emotional disturbance would include too many children in
special education and increase the schools' burdens
accordingly. 143 The court went on to state that "finding that
Edward was socially maladjusted does not end the inquiry.
The regulations contemplate that a student may be socially
maladjusted and suffer an independent serious emotional
disturbance that would qualify him for special education
services .
"..."144 The court concluded that he did not,
discussing the considerations in the regulation.14 5
The portion of the court's reasoning that gave an
independent meaning to social maladjustment, equating it
with a diagnosis of conduct disorder and viewing it as an
exclusion from the category of emotional disturbance, is
contrary to the regulation's language and its clear intent.
The court removed conduct disorder as a basis for emotional
disturbance and required that some "independent serious
emotional disturbance" meet one of the various factors
found in paragraph (c)(4)(i). But the regulation simply
provides that if one of the factors is met, the child qualifies
as emotionally disturbed. If the child is a juvenile
delinquent and none of the factors are satisfied, then the
regulation excludes the child. But it is not the social
maladjustment that does the excluding; it is the failure to
satisfy paragraph (c)(4)(i). Of course, equating juvenile
delinquency or mere misconduct with emotional disturbance
would include more children as special education-eligible
than Congress intended. But if a conduct disorder manifests
itself in one or more of the factors the regulation sets out, it
qualifies as severe emotional disturbance whether or not one
may accurately characterize it as social maladjustment. 146
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 664-65.
145. Id. at 665.
146. Other cases follow Springer's approach. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. JD,
232 F.3d 886 (4th Cir. 2000) (unpublished) (ruling that child's problems
stemmed from social maladjustment, not educational disability that district
overlooked); Brendan K. ex rel. Lisa K. v. Easton Area Sch. Dist., No. 05-4179,
2007 WL 1160377, at *11 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 16, 2007) (finding child not eligible and
quoting Springer regarding carving out social maladjustment from emotional
disturbance); N.C. ex rel. M.C. v. Bedford Cent. Sch. Dist., 473 F. Supp. 2d 532,
546 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (finding child not eligible and separating social
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Many courts apply the language about social
maladjustment in a more considered way. For example, in
Independent School District No. 284 v. A.C., the Eighth
Circuit confronted the case of A.C., a fifteen-year-old girl
whose conduct in school included disruption of class,
profanity, insubordination, and truancy.147 Outside of
school, she used alcohol and drugs, was sexually
promiscuous, ran away from home, was suspected of forging
148
checks, and repeatedly threatened or attempted suicide.
A local hearing officer and state review officer ruled that
she was eligible under IDEA and that the proper placement
was a secure, residential treatment facility. 149 The district
court reversed the order for residential placement on the
basis of emotional disturbance; it drew a distinction
between unwillingness to attend school or comply with the
requirements of a public school placement and the inability
to attend school or comply with the placement. 150 The court
of appeals, however, disagreed, and reversed the district
court, declaring that the proper analysis could not be
"limited to a stark distinction between unwillingness and
inability to behave appropriately. There is a grey area
between normal, voluntary conduct and involuntary
physiological response, and that area is where Congress has
chosen to locate behavioral problems such as A.C.'s."'1 51 The
court turned to the factors now in paragraph (c)(4)(i) and
said, "Read naturally and as a whole, the law and the
regulations identify a class of children who are disabled
only in the sense that their abnormal emotional conditions
prevent them from choosing normal responses to normal
situations." 152 The child fell into that category, and the
condition so identified interfered with her learning to the
maladjustment from emotional disturbance category). In other contexts, courts
appear reluctant to afford IDEA remedies to children whose problems manifest
themselves in delinquency. See, e.g., Dale M. ex rel. Alice M. v. Bd. of Educ., 237
F.3d 813, 817 (7th Cir. 2001) (denying reimbursement for placement deemed to
be "jail substitute" for child with psychological impairment who engaged in
criminal conduct).
147. 258 F.3d 769 (8th Cir. 2001).
148. Id. at 771.
149. Id. at 773.
150. Id. at 775.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 775-76.
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point where a restrictive placement was needed. 153 Another
court applied a similar approach to determine that a ninthgrade child who performed in the 99th percentile in
standardized
tests but engaged in
drug abuse,
uncontrollable behavior at home, poor performance at
school, and truancy following his parents' divorce
proceedings met the standards154 for eligibility under the
emotional disturbance category.
As Professor Weithorn observes, the regulation that
includes the social maladjustment term is problematic in
that it too readily appears to separate children who are
socially maladjusted from those who are emotionally
disturbed, while it nevertheless uses criteria for emotional
disturbance that include characteristics associated with
social maladjustment, such as inappropriate behavior under
normal circumstances and the inability to build or maintain
interpersonal relationships. 155 Taking the regulation as it
stands, however, the problem with the judicial applications
of the term, the departure from its proper interpretation, is
affording social maladjustment an independent role as an
exclusion from the emotional disturbance category and
insisting that something independent of it satisfy the
emotional disturbance criteria. The regulation does not say
that, and the interpretation that it does is insupportable.

3. The Courts' Role in the IDEA Eligibility Mess. One
cannot take exception to the general approach to eligibility
taken by the courts discussed under heading 1, above,
which entails asking first to see if one of the listed disability
conditions exists; then, if the federal definition includes an
adverse-effect requirement, asking about adverse effect on
educational performance; and then, if the answer to both
questions is yes, asking whether as a result the child needs
special education. The statute and regulations employ a
structure that appears to demand such an approach. What
is far from justified, however, is relying on a state law
definition that requires the adverse effect be "significant"
when the federal regulation features the unadorned term,

153. Id. at 777-79.
154. New Paltz Cent. Sch. Dist. v. St. Pierre, 307 F. Supp. 2d 394 (N.D.N.Y.
2004).

155. Weithorn, supra note 11, at 1357. The article collects numerous sources
critical of the "socially maladjusted" language of the regulation. Id. at n.223.
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or relying on state law that defines educational
performance in a crabbed way. There is also no justification
to rely on a state law definition of "needs special education"
that restricts that phrase to needing services or
accommodations that cannot be provided in the regular
classroom even when the services or accommodations
provided in the regular classroom meet the ordinary
meaning of the term special education. Thus the reliance on
the odd state law definition of the need for special education
in Hood v. Encinitas Union School District156 and the
reliance on a strange definition of adverse effect on
157
educational performance in J.D. v. Pawlet School District
are wrong and should be rejected.
Professor Garda defends the use of state law definitions
for eligibility terms that the federal statute and regulations
leave undefined, specifically definitions of need for special
education and educational performance. 158 But there is
nothing in IDEA that delegates to the states the power to
define the federal statutory terms, 159 and there is no reason
156. 486 F.3d 1099, 1100 (9th Cir. 2007) (discussed supra text
accompanying notes 84-95).
157. 224 F.3d 60, 67 (2d Cir. 2000) (discussed supra text accompanying
notes 118-19).
158. See, e.g., Garda, supranote 8, at 299; Garda, supra note 9, at 465-67.
159. The one limited exception to this generalization demonstrates that
when a delegation is intended, it is explicit and arises from a specific situation
justifying delegation. Without giving any other authority to the states to define
the term "special education," the federal regulations permit states to define
what would otherwise be a "related service" as "special education" if they choose
to do so. 34 C.F.R. § 300.39(a)(2)(i) (2008). This regulation responded to the
situation in the years preceding the 1975 Act, when states varied as to whether
a child who required only speech therapy or had similar needs for a very specific
and limited form of intervention was be considered eligible for special
education. The federal regulators decided to permit the states to retain their
existing modes of classification on this point. States that defined these services
as outside of special education would not receive federal money to assist those
children, but would continue to use state resources. The original version of the
regulation said that special education "includes speech pathology, audiology,
occupational therapy, and physical therapy, if the service is considered 'special
education' rather than a 'related service' under State standards." 41 Fed. Reg.
56978 (proposed Dec. 30, 1976) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 121a.4). The final
version merely mentioned "speech pathology, or any other related service, if the
service ... is considered 'special education' rather than a 'related service' under
State standards." 45 C.F.R. § 121a.14 (1978). Neither this history nor whatever
autonomy states have over curriculum provides a basis for states to define out
of existence the adverse effect of a child's physical or mental condition on
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that a child in Vermont should be ineligible for special
education when the same child would be eligible in Maine
under the identical federally supported program. Although
the definition of "appropriate" education in IDEA references
state law, the definition of "child with a disability" does
not. 160 The Department of Education has occasionally said
in informal statements that various terms of IDEA were
open to the states to define, 161 but Congress explicitly
provided in IDEA that non-regulation guidance of this sort
is not binding,162 and there is no explicit basis for it in this
instance. Considerations of federalism that may support
local or state control on matters such as curricular content
or levels of educational expenditures 163 are out of place
when the threshold question is who is to be served under a
federally funded program designed to address the national
problem of children with disabilities who are out of school
or in inappropriate programs. 164
The state law definitions at issue in cases such as Hood
and J.D. are particularly inapt because they eliminate the
federal entitlements to special education services of
children by defining the children out of the coverage of the
statute Congress wrote. State law provisions that restrict
entitlements established by federal statutes are void under
the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution. 165 The Supreme
Court has applied this principle in cases regarding benefit
educational performance, a test that is part of a clinical standard in a federal
law term regarding federal statutory protection.
160. Compare 20 U.S.C.A. § 1401(9)(B) (West Supp. 2008) (defining free,
appropriate public education to include meeting the standards of the state

educational agency) with § 1401(3) (allowing discretion to states in defining
eligible children only with regard to adoption of disability category of children
aged three through nine experiencing developmental delay).
161. See Garda, supra note 8, at 300 (collecting federal guidance regarding
states' ability to define educational performance). But see Garda, supra note 9,
at 465 n. 128 (noting that guidance from the relevant federal office "is less than
clear on the subject").
162. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1406(e)(1) (West Supp. 2008).
163. Cf. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973)
(holding that equal protection does not require equality of educational
expenditures among school districts in state, citing local autonomy concerns).
164. See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1400(c)(2), (d) (West 2000) (reciting original findings
about unserved children with disabilities and noting continuing purposes of
IDEA to guarantee that children have appropriate education).
165. See U.S. CONST., art. VI, § 1, cl. 2.
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programs in which the federal government provides funding
to states on the condition they comply with the terms of the
federal program, the same arrangement that exists for
special education under IDEA. In Rosado v. Wyman, the
Supreme Court ruled that a provision of New York law that
redefined a standard of need in setting benefit amounts for
federally funded welfare did not conform to the statutory
requirements of the federal statute, when those requirements
were properly interpreted. 166 The new definition of need
adopted by the state eliminated items of need included
before, so as to reduce benefits to families or cut them off
from assistance. 167 The Court held that the state was not
free to adopt a definition that restricted benefits in a way
the federal statute did not specifically authorize. 168 The
Court pointed out that the state was free to reject federal
money and opt out of the program, but it stressed that the
proper interpretation of the federal statute adopted by
Congress was the overriding concern, and that was a job for
the judiciary, not the state administration. 169 Justice
Harlan, writing for the majority, quoted Justice Cardozo:
"When [federal] money is spent to promote the general
welfare, the concept of welfare
or the opposite is shaped by
70
Congress, not the states."'
Courts have compounded the definitional problem by
using the Rowley case to support their constricted views of
what it means to need special education on account of a
disability. Professor Garda rightly criticizes this "reverse
166. 397 U.S. 397 (1970).
167. Id. at 416-17.
168. Id. at 417-18.
169. See id. at 421-22.
170. Id. at 423 (quoting Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 645 (1937))
(alteration in original). Many cases that overturn state definitional restrictions
on federal entitlements in federal-state cooperative programs are in the public
welfare field. See, e.g., Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282 (1971) (overturning
state definition of "dependent child" that excluded college students from welfare
eligibility under federal-state program); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968)
(overturning state definition of "parent" that operated to exclude families from
welfare eligibility under federal-state program). Like IDEA, these programs are
forms of "cooperative federalism." Compare Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 52
(2005) (quoting Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Mauney, 183 F.3d 816, 830 (8th Cir.
1999) referring to IDEA as "cooperative federalism"), with King, 392 U.S. at 316
(1968) (referring to Aid to Families with Dependent Children program as
"cooperative federalism").
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engineering" of Rowley's interpretation of appropriate
education standards into the analysis of when a child needs
special education. 171 The deaf child in the Rowley case was,
of course, eligible for special education even though she was
performing as well as or better than her peers. The level of
services a child is entitled to once the child is eligible is a
different topic from whether the child is eligible in the first
place, and to rely on Rowley to reach a decision on the
eligibility topic is to make a category mistake. The reality is
that there exists no precise definition for "needs special
education" beyond the meaning of the words themselves. As
with so many other terms in federal law, the courts (and
other decision makers) develop a working sense of who or
what falls within the statutory term by deciding the matter
case-by-case and then, after passage of time, looking back
and seeing if a definition has emerged. 172 From the
diversity of caselaw results, it does not appear that a
picture has yet come into focus.
Similar hypertrophied definition-making appears to be
at work in the construction of IDEA's eligibility term for
emotional disturbance. There is no justification for giving an
independent categorical meaning to "social maladjustment"
and separating it out from "emotional disturbance." The
courts that proceed directly to the term of the regulation
defining emotional disturbance and compare the child's
characteristics-from whatever psychological or physiological
source-to the requirements in the regulation are the ones
that are interpreting the statute properly. Commentators
agree that turning social maladjustment into an exclusion
undermines congressional intent and harms children. 173

171. Garda, supra note 9, at 509. Professor Garda goes on to use Rowley's
approach to support the proposition that children passing, yet performing
poorly, need special education under the statute. Id. at 509-11.
172. Cf. Note, Enforcing the Right to an "Appropriate" Education: The
Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, 92 HARv. L. REV. 1103
(1979) (suggesting use of common-law development to inform meaning of
appropriate education term of statute).
173. See Weithorn, supra note 11, at 1357; O'Neill, supra note 124, at 120307; see also Theresa Glennon, DisablingAmbiguities: Confronting Barriers to
the Education of Students with Emotional Disabilities, 60 TENN. L. REV. 295,
334-35 (1993) (describing social maladjustment provision as source of confusion
and underidentification of children as emotionally disturbed).
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Relying on some of the cases discussed above and quite
a number of others, Professor Hensel concludes that courts
and other decision makers in IDEA disputes are mimicking
courts in ADA employment actions by excluding from
consideration individuals who do not satisfy a stereotype of
the truly disabled. 174 Thus they apply a severity screen that
resembles the "substantially limits one or more major life
activities" term of the ADA as some courts have
restrictively defined it.175 Like the courts in ADA
employment cases, they reduce the number of individuals
covered by the statute and manifest an attitude that
persons with disabilities are an irreducible "other" who are
different from the nondisabled norm in obvious and
unbridgeable ways. 176 Predictably, this will undermine the
basis in popular support for special education funding and
promote the demonizing of the ever-smaller class 177
of
children said to absorb resources from general education.
The correct approach should be just the opposite. It should
broaden the eligibility for assistance of children who need
help in order to learn, whatever the origin of their
problems. Some form of eligibility determination may be
necessary for the special education system to work, but
labeling should not be emphasized, nor should the class of

174. Hensel, supra note 10, at 1180-87.
175. Id. at 1184 (referring to 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(2)(A) (West 2005)). It was
entirely predictable that this type of thinking would emerge. Many of the
lawyers defending disability discrimination actions by arguing the limited
coverage of the ADA are from firms that practice school-side special education
law. School administrators who long had lawyers looking after their interests in
labor-management issues turned to the same firms for representation in special
education matters when they encountered legal disputes of this type. There is,
of course, nothing sinister in any of this, but it should be no surprise that legal
approaches would migrate from one area to the other. An additional source
drawing comparisons between restrictions on special education eligibility and
narrow views about who is protected under the ADA is Nicholas L. Townsend,
Framinga Ceiling as a Floor: The Changing Definition of Learning Disabilities
and the Conflicting Trends in LegislationAffecting Learning Disabled Students,
40 CREIGHTON L. REV. 229, 266-67 (2007). Congress has recently corrected the
courts' narrow definition of ADA coverage. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub.
L. No. 110-326, 122 Stat. 3553.
176. Hensel, supranote 10, at 1185.
177. Id. at 1187-96; see also Perlin, supra note 11, at 42 (discussing "sanist
myths" about persons with mental disabilities that isolate these individuals and
confer stigma on them, such as the myth that people with mental disabilities
are faking their condition or simply need to try harder).
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eligible children be artificially narrowed. 178 Special
education should be a bundle of extra services available to
the many who need them rather than a place to hide the
supposedly uneducable few. 179 Professor Hensel's position
has much to recommend it as an analysis of what the courts
are doing and a proposal for which direction the law should
move toward. Policy prescriptions need to be developed
from these insights, but first it is necessary to look to the
other issues present in the current IDEA eligibility
controversy.
B. Concerns About Learning DisabilitiesIdentification,
and the RTI Response
It is no easy task to repair a vehicle while it is moving.
The previous discussion tries to demonstrate that many
caselaw interpretations of IDEA's eligibility terms are
broken. But IDEA itself is moving on, with recent statutory
and regulatory amendments that reflect new approaches to
identifying children as eligible with regard to the largest
single eligibility category, that of learning disability. These
approaches reflect a discontent with current methods of
identifying children with learning disabilities, and take the
form of Response-to-Intervention (RTI) methodologies. The
the current uncertainty about
changes contribute to
1 80
IDEA.
under
eligibility
178. See Hensel, supra note 10, at 1196-97.
179. See id. at 1200 (making point in
overidentification of children with disabilities).

context

of

discussion

of

180. Other recent changes to IDEA may also affect eligibility
determinations, but at the moment they do not appear significant enough to
warrant extended treatment. For example, the 2004 Reauthorization of IDEA
demands that children with disabilities be included in state and district
assessment programs, including those for the No Child Left Behind initiative.
20 U.S.C.A. § 1412(a)(16)(A) (West 2005). Students with disabilities need to be
given appropriate accommodations and alternative assessments when
necessary and as indicated in their individualized education programs; the state
or district conducting the assessment program has to develop guidelines for
furnishing accommodations. § 1412(a)(16)(B)-(C). The alternate assessments
have to be aligned with the challenging academic content standards and
achievement standards of the state. § 1412(a)(16)(C)(ii)(I). If the state has
adopted alternate achievement standards, the alternate assessment has to
measure student achievement against the standards. § 1412(a)(16)(C)(ii)(II).
The proliferation of detail and the increase in emphasis regarding the
achievement testing of children with disabilities may create incentives for
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1. Discontent About Identification of Children with
Learning Disabilities.Between 1976 and 1996, the number
of students identified under the category of specific learning
disabilities (SLD or LD) increased 283% to 2,259,000.181
The number currently stands at 2,710,476, making SLD the
largest disability category, with about 45% of all IDEAeligible children. 8 2 This explosion in child count may not be
so remarkable. The SLD label is usually considered less
stigmatizing than mental retardation or other labels, so
schools and parents may be lighting on this category in all
plausible instances. 8 3 Problems have arisen, however,
because the growth in the category has occurred against a
background of increased criticism of intelligence testing, the
traditional method used to determine learning disability,
and that reality has in turn led to criticism of the
conceptual integrity of the SLD category itself.184
Traditionally, a learning disability is diagnosed based
on the presence of a severe discrepancy between achievement
and intellectual ability in one or more areas of learning. 8 5
IQ testing is the classic means to determine intellectual

administrators to initiate or resist special education identification for the
children in their schools. See Weber, supra note 23, at 20-21 (collecting reports
of manipulation of testing cohorts of students with disabilities). Another change
in the new law that may affect eligibility is the adoption of a default timeline
(that is, unless the state has a different one) of sixty days maximum from
receipt of parental consent for evaluation to completion of evaluation. 20
U.S.C.A. § 1414(a)(1)(C) (West Supp. 2008).

181. Frank M. Gresham, Responsiveness to Intervention: An Alternative
Approach to Identification of Learning Disabilities, in IDENTIFICATION OF
LEARNING DISABILITIES: RESEARCH TO PRACTICE (Renee Bradley, et. al. ed.,2002),

available at, http://nrcld.org/resources/ldsummit/gresham4.pdf.
182. See U.S. Dep't of Educ., Data Tables for OSEP State Reported Data,
https://www.ideadata.org/tables30th/ar_1-3.xls (last visited Aug. 4, 2008). The
count is as of Fall 2006, and includes schoolchildren ages six through twentyone.

183. See Terry Jean Seligmann, An IDEA Schools Can Use: Lessons from
Special Education Legislation, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 759, 770 & n.67 (2001)
(collecting sources and attributing rise in SLD identification to recognition of
lower stigma and other factors).
184. See supra note 180 (reporting criticism of standardized testing
implementation).
185. Louise Spear-Swerling, Response to Intervention and Teacher
Preparation, in EDUCATING INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES: IDEIA 2004 AND
BEYOND 273, 276 (Elena L. Grigorenko ed. 2008).
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ability.' 8 6 Critics contend that methods dependent on IQ
testing magnify the effects of IQ measurement errors and
make the unjustified assumption that IQ is a good ability
measure. 8 7 They challenge the reliability (that is, the
stability from testing session to testing session) of
discrepancy measurements.1 88 Moreover, they observe that
there are wide variations from state to state concerning
how much discrepancy will support a conclusion that a
learning disability exists. 8 9 One researcher summarized
the case he and others have made against the discrepancy
approach:
We believe that the balance of the evidence shows that the
severe discrepancy classification criteria are (a) unreliable
(particularly in the sense of stability), (b) invalid (poor readers
with higher IQs do not differ on relevant variables from those
with IQs commensurate with reading levels), (c) easily
undermined in practice by giving multiple tests, finding a score
that is discrepant and ignoring disconfirming evidence, and (d)
harmful because the severe discrepancy delays treatment from
kindergarten or first grade when the symptoms of reading
disability are first manifested to 3rd or 4th grade when reading
problems are more severe, intervention more complex, and the
shifts [from learning to read] to "reading to
school curriculum
1 90
learn."

IQ-discrepancy methodology has its defenders, however, 191
and there are also some authorities who take a middle

186. Id. at 276-77.
187. See Gresham, supra note 181.

188. See Jack M. Fletcher et al., Alternative Approaches to the Definition
and Identification of Learning Disabilities:Some Questions and Answers, BNET
(2004),
http://findarticles.comlp/articles/mi-qa3809/is_200412/ain9471603
/pgl?tag=artBody;coll.
189. Daniel J. Reschly & John L. Hosp, State SLD Identification Policies
and Practices,27 LEARNING DISABILITIES Q. 197, 208-10 (2004).
190. Daniel J. Reschly, What if LD Changed to Reflect Research Findings?
(Dec. 2003), http://www.nrcld.org/symposium2003/reschly/reschly2.html.
191. Kenneth A. Kavale et al., The Feasibility of a Responsiveness to
Intervention Approach for the Identification of Specific Learning Disability: A
PsychometricAlternative (Dec. 2003),
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position, suggesting that both IQ-discrepancy and other
means should be employed in determining the existence of
192
learning disability.
Use of existing methodologies to determine the presence
of LD causes widely varying counts of LD children, with
some states reporting percentages more than three times
those of other states. 193 This reality, doubts about IQ
testing, and natural caution about labeling leads some
writers to doubt whether a concept of learning disability
ought to exist at all. 194 Other critics are willing to posit the
existence of learning disabilities, but deny that the
condition should have a role in educational decision
making, much less be the basis for what the writers
perceive as preferential treatment for students who are

http://www.nrcld.org/symposium2003/kavale/kavale.pdf
("The
value
of
discrepancy lies in its ability to document the unexpected nature of the learning
problem. Everything else being equal, there was little reason to believe that the
particular student would experience learning difficulties. Since the
underachievement dimension is integral to the SLD construct, it may represent
a better 'first gate to learning disabilities identification' . . . than the proposed
RTI model.") (citation omitted); see Jack A. Naglieri & Alan S. Kaufman, IDEA
and Specific Learning Disabilities, in EDUCATING INDIVIDUALS WITH
DISABILITIES: IDEIA 2004 AND BEYOND, supra note 185, at 165 (defending
specific cognitive testing and criticizing RTI).
192. Tom Scruggs, Alternatives to RTI in the Assessment of Learning
Disabilities (Dec. 2003),
http://www.nrcld.org/symposium2003/scruggs/
scruggs5.html (proposing that RTI operate as part of general education and
that low achievers in one or more areas demonstrate IQ-achievement
discrepancy to be considered LD).
193. Reschly, supra note 190 ("LD prevalence . . . varies by a factor of 3
times in the U.S. (KY=2.76% vs. RI at 9.46%) ....
Moreover, LD prevalence
within states varies markedly. . . ."); see Kavale et al., supra note 191 ("Besides
over-identification, another problem is found in the very different numbers of
students with LD identified across settings. The significant variability is seen,
for example, across states where prevalence rates have been found to range
from 2% to 7% .... There is little rhyme or reason for these different rates, and
it appears that they may primarily reflect a lack of consistency in identification
procedures .... ") (citations omitted). Professor Kavale attributes the variability
to insufficiently rigorous and uniform application of discrepancy methodology,
rather than reliance on discrepancy approaches per se. Id.
194. See, e.g., Robert J. Sternberg & Elena L. Grigorenko, Which Queue?, 97
MICH. L. REV. 1928 (1999) (declaring learning disability concept invalid in
practice) (book review); see also Scruggs, supra note 192 (collecting and
criticizing sources that "manifest... hostility to the entire category of learning
disabilities").
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identified as having LD. 195 When it comes to leading
educational researchers, however, "virtually all authorities
1 96
recognize

the

existence

of

genuine

cases

of

LD."'

Ironically, just as the doubts about the integrity of the LD
concept are becoming part of the popular culture, evidence
is emerging that dyslexia, the best known form of learning
disability, has an organic basis that may, in time, be able to
be diagnosed through methods such as magnetic resonance
imaging (MRI) tests of the brain. 197 It has also become clear
that one common criticism of the LD concept, the charge
that rich parents buy LD diagnoses for their children in
order to secure accommodations that confer a competitive
advantage in school, is an urban legend. 198 Professor
Shaywitz, a leading authority on dyslexia and a well known
critic of IQ-discrepancy methodology, states, "In all my
195. See MARK KELMAN & GILLIAN LESTER, JUMPING THE QUEUE: AN INQUIRY
INTO THE LEGAL TREATMENT OF STUDENTS WITH LEARNING DISABILITIES (1997).
For criticisms of Kelman and Lester, see Andrew Weis, Jumping to Conclusions
in "Jumpingthe Queue," 51 STAN. L. REV. 183 (1998) (book review).
196. Spear-Swerling, supra note 185, at 273 (further noting that despite
recognition of genuine cases of LD, "some investigators have argued that the LD
category helps to excuse schools from the responsibility of teaching all children
successfully").
197. See SALLY SHAYWITZ, OVERCOMING DYSLEXIA 82, 85 (2003); Michael M.
Gerber, Teachers Are Still the Test: Limitations of Response to Instruction
Strategies for Identifying Children with Learning Disabilities (Dec. 2003),
("[T]here is rapidly
http://www.nrcld.org/symposium2003/gerber/gerber.pdf
accumulating evidence that at least some learning disabilities-the same
associated with phonological processing deficiencies in behavioral testing-are
associated

with a

clear . .

.

and modifiable . . . neurological substrate.

Therefore, ... there is strong reason to suppose that, in principal [sic], students
displaying this condition can be reliably identified independent of instructional
trials.") (citations omitted); see Margaret Semrud-Clikeman, Neuropsychological
2003),
(Dec.
Disabilities
Learning
for
Evaluating
Aspects
Authorities
http://www.nrcld.org/symposium20O3/clikeman/clikeman3.html.
discussing the physiological basis of dyslexia are nonetheless skeptical about
the effectiveness of IQ testing in determining the presence of the condition. See
LILIANE

SPRENGER-CHAROLLES

ET

AL.,

READING

ACQUISITION

AND

DEVELOPMENTAL DYSLEXIA 72-73 (2006); see also SHAYWITZ, supra, at 139
("There is an emerging consensus among researchers and clinicians that the
dependence on a discrepancy between IQ and reading achievement for a
diagnosis of dyslexia has outlived its usefulness except in very limited
circumstances.").
198. Reschly, supra note 190 ("[A]ll studies that I have read or conducted on
children and youth with LD confirms virtually without any exceptions that all
have significant achievement problems.... There is no 'fraud' in LD. On that I
believe most will agree.").
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experience with scores and scores of students, I have yet to
encounter a young man or woman who falsely claims to be
dyslexic. For those who understand dyslexia and its
tremendous costs to the individual, the very idea that
someone would willingly seek such a diagnosis is absurd."199
In fact, the stigma of the label makes it something no one
would accept unless200a severe underlying problem led the
person to seek help.
Nevertheless, the fact that learning disabilities actually
exist and have a physiological basis may not be crucial for
educational decision making. A consensus is emerging that
effective instruction does not depend on the results of the
psychological testing that has traditionally been used in LD
diagnosis. 201 And this may mean that the controversies over
testing and categorical integrity need never be resolved if
children who need assistance can be identified sufficiently
that they can be2 given instruction that meets their
educational needs. 02
2. Response to Intervention Methodology. One attempt
to provide that form of instruction is Response to
Intervention (RTI) methodology. RTI is a process by which
children in early grades who are not achieving at a level
commensurate with their class or the norms for their grade
receive more individualized and more intense instruction

199. SHAYWITZ, supra note 197, at 164.
200. See id. ("I am puzzled by the often-repeated notion that some students
pretend to be dyslexic. When asked about this, I always respond by asking in
turn, 'Do you know this for a fact? Are you personally aware of such a case?'
Invariably the person shakes her head and replies, 'Oh no, it's just something
I've heard.' Such notions are nonsense.").
201. Gresham, supra note 181 ("Ostensibly, 'verbal' learners should learn

more efficiently and effectively under verbal instruction and 'visual' learners
should learn more efficiently and effectively under visual instruction.
Unfortunately, there is little empirical support for the differential prescription
of treatments based on different abilities or aptitudes ...."); Reschly, supra

note 190, (stating that no empirical support exists for methods that match
cognitive strengths of students with LD to teaching modalities).
202. Some authorities appear reluctant to embrace RTI because of the
perceived threat it poses to existing constructs of a distinct learning disability
category. See, e.g., Scruggs, supra note 192. For purposes of educational policy
and legislation, however, what matters is not whether a distinct "learning
disabilities" category survives, but what is the best means to educate students
who have difficulties learning when exposed to ordinary instruction and who
could be learning more with appropriate education.
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with methods that have been validated as effective, while at
the same time continuing to attend their general education
classes during the lengthy periods of intervention. 2 3 Those
children who do not make adequate progress when exposed
to these progressively more intense methods over a set
number of weeks are deemed to have a learning
disability. 20 4 Intervention ceases for the rest, although the
teacher continues to monitor their progress regularly. The
specialized instruction includes phases (sometimes called
tiers) of intervention. 20 5 The first phase is nothing more
than high quality instruction and careful assessment of the
learning progress of all students on the classroom
curriculum. 206 Students who are below a proficiency
criterion are referred for a second phase of more intense
instruction to meet the weaknesses their assessments
display; these interventions are implemented by the

203. Gresham, supra note 181. State education departments have adopted
their own definitions of RTI. For example, Virginia defines RTI (using the
abbreviation "RtI") as "primarily an instructional framework and philosophy,
the goals and objectives of which include early intervention for students who
struggle to attain or maintain grade level performance." DIV OF SPECIAL EDUC. &
STUDENT SERVS., COMMONWEALTH OF VA. DEP'T OF EDUC., RESPONSIVE
INSTRUCTION: REFINING OUR WORK OF TEACHING ALL CHILDREN 6 (October 2007),

http://www.doe.virginia.govfVDOE/studentsrvcs/rti-guidance-document.pdf
[hereinafter VA. DEP'T OF EDUC.]. The document describes RTI as involving
"universal screening; multiple layers or 'tiers' of instruction, intervention, and
support, and progress monitoring (an integrated data collection and assessment
system to inform decision making)." Id. at 7.
204. Lynn S. Fuchs et al., Response to Intervention: A Strategy for the
Prevention and Identification of Learning Disabilities, in EDUCATING
INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES: IDEIA 2004 AND BEYOND, supra note 185, at 115,
116 ('The premise behind RTI is that students are identified as having LD
when their response to validated intervention is dramatically inferior to that of
their peers. The inference is that these children who respond poorly to generally
effective interventions have a disability that requires specialized treatment to
produce successful learning outcomes.") (citation omitted).
205. See id. at 115-23 (describing three-tiered model).
206. Learning Disabilities Ass'n of America, The Role of Parents/Family in
(2004),
Intervention
to
Responsiveness
see Gresham, supra
http://www.ldaamerica.org/news/print-role-parents.asp;
note 181 (describing monitoring at this phase). Classwide screening ties into
NCLB. NCLB's Reading First initiative gives funding for reading programs for
children in kindergarten through grade three, and one of the required uses of
the money is "administering screening, diagnostic, and classroom-based
instructional reading assessments." 20 U.S.C.A. § 6362(c)(7)(A)(i) (West 2003).
Thanks to Suzanne Whitney for this insight.
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classroom teacher over a period of perhaps six weeks. 20 7
Students whose progress is not adequate enter a third
phase, in which they receive a specially designed set of
educational interventions for a period of eight or more
weeks. 20 8 This phase may or may not be designated special
education. 20 9 Children who do not respond to intervention
after this intensive intervention may be designated as
having a learning disability on the basis of the failure to
respond or on that basis plus other indicators. 210
IDEA does not require the use of RTI, but amendments
made in the 2004 Reauthorization pave the way for RTI by
forbidding states from forcing school districts to use
discrepancy criteria when determining if a child has a

207. Gresham, supra note 181.
208. Id. One source describes the intervention as about thirty minutes of
supplemental instruction a day, with progress monitored twice a month; the
phase, under this model, may last ten to twenty weeks. Douglas Marston, Tiers
of Intervention in Responsiveness to Intervention: Prevention Outcomes and
Learning Disabilities Identification Patterns, 38 J. LEARNING DISABILITIES 539,

540 (2005).
209. Gresham, supra note 181. ("Essentially, this phase represents
special-education diagnostic trial period .

. .

a

."). Some models incorporate a

fourth tier of even more specialized instruction, but as with the composite model
Gresham describes, the latter phases might be designated special education. See
Council for Exceptional Children, Response-to-Intervention-The Promise and the
Peril,
http://www.cec.sped.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Home&TEMPLATE=/
CMlContentDisplay.cfm&CONTENTID=8427 (last visited Aug. 4, 2008)
("Special education teachers may help develop interventions and/or plan
assessments for students receiving instruction and interventions in Tiers 1 and
2. They may not provide instruction to students until Tier 3 or 4, when the
student could be referred and identified for special education.").
210. See Council for Exceptional Children, supranote 209 ("Students who do
not respond to intervention are referred to special education. This step is taken
after intensive intervention has not helped."). There is disagreement about how
much weight should be placed on the simple fact of failure to make adequate
progress following the interventions in the determination of learning disability,
and how many additional assessments should be undertaken. See id. (collecting
educational research sources).
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specific learning disability. 211 The Reauthorization also
creates a funding stream for RTI by permitting school
districts to use up to 15% of federal special education
funding to provide services to children who have not been
found to be eligible under IDEA but who need additional
support to succeed in general education. 212 These "Early
Intervening Services" funds may be used to underwrite
RTI. 21 3 IDEA further provides that a child shall not be
identified as a child with a disability for purposes of the
statute if the "determinant factor" is lack of appropriate
instruction in reading or mathematics. 214 A goal of RTI is to
exclude from the learning disability category those children
stem simply from lack of adequate
whose difficulties
215
instruction.
The United States Department of Education regulations
implementing the 2004 Reauthorization also promote the
use of RTI methods. The Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
urged recipients of federal special education funding to
abandon IQ discrepancy and extolled the benefits of an RTI
process. 216 The final regulations repeat the statutory
for
methods
permitting non-discrepancy
language
determining LD, including methods relying on the child's
217
response to scientific, research-based intervention.
Moreover, they omit a provision in the earlier regulations

211. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1414(b)(6)(A) (West Supp. 2008). The statute specifically
permits school districts to "use a process that determines if the child responds
to scientific, research-based intervention as part of the evaluation procedures"
in ascertaining whether the child has specific learning disabilities.
§ 1414(b)(6)(B). The Department of Education has interpreted the Act as
permitting state educational agencies to require local school districts to use
RTI. U.S. Dep't of Educ., Questions and Answers on Response to Intervention

(RTI) and Early Intervening Services (EIS), Question C-4 (Jan. 2007),
http://idea.ed.gov/explore/view/p/%2Croot%2Cdynamic%2CQaCorner%2C8%2C.
212. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1413(f) (West Supp. 2008).
213. See § 1413(f)(1), (2)(B).
214. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1414(b)(5)(A)-(B).
215. See Fuchs et al., supra note 204, at 116 ("[Ilf an at-risk student
responds well to intervention, then their low achievement can be attributed to
lack of appropriate instruction, not a learning disability.').
216. See Additional Procedures for Evaluating Children with Specific
Learning Disabilities, 70 Fed. Reg. 35,802, 35,864, (June 21, 2005).
217. 34 C.F.R. § 300.307(a) (2008); see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.309(a)(2)(i)
(2008).
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stating that a child could be determined to have a specific
learning disability if he or she "has a severe discrepancy
between achievement and intellectual ability in one or
more" areas of learning. 218 The regulations modify the prior
rule's reference to achievement commensurate with age
"and ability levels" and make it achievement adequate for
219
age or meeting state-approved grade-level standards.
The new regulations add extensive provisions requiring
determinations that findings with regard to performance or
progress of the child are not "primarily the result of' other
disabilities
or
disadvantages,
and
they
require
consideration of data that demonstrate that before, or as
part of the referral process, the child received appropriate
instruction delivered by qualified personnel in general
education settings, and "[d]ata-based documentation of
repeated assessments of achievement at reasonable
intervals, reflecting formal assessment of student progress
during instruction, which was provided to the child's
parents."220 Perhaps something other than an RTI process
could provide the relevant data and documentation, but
properly implemented RTI methods are an obvious way to
gather the data and produce the documentation.
3. Benefits of RTI. Even those who defend discrepancy
methodology may have to agree that there are virtues to an
RTI approach. First, it delivers instructional intervention to
children who need it, and it does so before test score
discrepancies emerge, which typically occurs in grade three

218. 34 C.F.R. § 300.541(a)(2) (2007) (superseded).
219. 34 C.F.R. § 300.309(a)(1). The regulations appear to allow for the use of
some discrepancy-based methods by permitting eligibility when the child
"exhibits a pattern of strengths and weaknesses in performance, achievement,
or both, relative to age, State-approved grade-level standards, or intellectual
development, that is determined . . . to be relevant to the identification of a
specific learning disability, using appropriate assessments" otherwise
consistent with the regulations. § 300.309(a)(2)(ii).
220. § 300.309(b); see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.310 (2008) (requiring class
observation of the child prior to determination); 34 C.F.R. § 300.311 (2008)
(requiring additional documentation on various topics related to specific
learning disability determination).
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or later. 221 Second, even for students who eventually are
found to be special education-eligible, the method gives data
about which educational interventions do or do not produce
progress for a specific child, something discrepancy testing
methods do not achieve, and which will likely be useful in
designing a special education program. 222 Third, RTI may
help keep students who do not actually have learning
disabilities out of special education, while at the same time
conferring educational benefit on them. These are children
who may be characterized as "instructional casualties" (the
victims of poor teaching practices who could learn if
exposed to good teaching), or who come from troubled home
environments, or who have other non-disability related
circumstances that keep them from learning as well as they
3
can. 22
A frequently cited benefit of RTI is that it reduces
referrals 224 to special education. 225 There are difficulties
with considering this a true consequence of RTI, or, for that
matter, a benefit. Although many studies show a reduction
in referrals when school districts use RTI, 226 the referral
count is extremely easy to manipulate. A school district can
221. Nat'l Joint Comm. on Learning Disabilities, Responsiveness to
Intervention and Learning Disabilities, 28 LEARNING DISABILITY Q. 249, 252
(2005). The use of objective criteria for intervention in the form of classwide
assessments has the related advantage of not requiring the child to wait for a
referral to special education (something typically initiated by the classroom
teacher) before receiving help. See Fletcher et al., supra note 188 ("Teacher
referral has been demonstrated to be biased, yielding disproportionate numbers
of boys and African Americans, likely reflecting behavior management
difficulties that make many referred students difficult to manage in the
classroom.") (citation omitted).
222. See Nat'l Joint Comm. on Learning Disabilities, supra note 221, at 252.
223. Fletcher et al., supra note 188 (discussing "instructional casualties" to
be provided accelerated instruction under RTI methodology); Spear-Swerling,
supra note 185, at 277 ("In their emphases on high-quality Tier 1 instruction
and timely, research-based interventions, RTI approaches have the potential to
benefit a broad range of children, not only those with genuine LD.").
224. Referral practices are the key, because most children referred by their
teachers are determined to be eligible. See Reschly, supra note 190 ("Findings
indicate that 90% of students referred by teachers are evaluated for special
education and 70% are found eligible.") (citation omitted).
225. See, e.g., Nat'l Joint Comm. on Learning Disabilities, supra note 221, at
252.
226. See, e.g., Fletcher et al., supra note 188 (citing studies from California
and Connecticut).
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simply send the word out to teachers not to make special
education referrals. 27 Informal messages of this type are
extremely likely when local administrators have invested
money and prestige in an elaborate RTI program. 228 One of
the best known proponents of RTI, Douglas Fuchs, has
cautioned about these tactics: "It's easy to reduce the
numbers of children in special education programs. You just
have to stop referring them. ' 229 Moreover, if decreasing the
number of students referred to and receiving special
education means that children who need help receive fewer
or less effective services, the situation will have been made
worse in the name of making it better.
4. Problems with RTI. Balanced against the possible
benefits of RTI are a number of anticipated difficulties with
it. The first is that of the bright child who achieves at grade
level despite dyslexia or some other learning disability who
could nevertheless benefit from special education. Dyslexia,
for example, can be present in a child with high general
intelligence. 230 Estimates of the percentage of children with

227. An example of this is the Virginia RTI plan, which states that "[o]nly
after several . . . systematic and research-grounded interventions have been
implemented and evaluated, and a child has consistently failed to make
adequate progress, may s/he be considered for special education evaluation." VA.
DEP'T OF EDUC., supra note 203, at 2. In fact, the relevant federal regulation
simply states that the group determining the existence of a child's learning
disability "must consider, as part of the evaluation . . . data that demonstrate
that prior to, or as a part of, the referral process, the child was provided
appropriate instruction in regular education settings, delivered by qualified
personnel." 34 C.F.R. § 300.309(b)(1) (2008). This provision creates a standard
for the process of finding eligibility, not a standard for when a child may be
considered for eligibility.
228. See Michael Alison Chandler, Waiting Too Late to Test?, WASH. POST,
Dec. 31, 2007, at B6, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdynlcontent/article/2007/12/30/AR2007123002447_pf.html
("For many school
systems, RTI-influenced strategies have led to a significant drop in the number
of special education students. .. . The new approach has led to a backlash
among parents who say their children aren't getting the help they need. A
parent-led advisory committee told the Loudoun School Board in the fall that
the school system appeared to be under-identifying students who should qualify
for special education.").
229. Id.
230. SHAYWITZ, supra note 197, at 82.
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learning disabilities who are gifted range from 2-5%.231
These students tend to use their general intelligence to
compensate for weaknesses in phonics, memorization,
computation, or other tasks, and are likely not to be
identified as having learning disabilities until later in their
schooling than other students with learning disabilities. 232
By allowing for a discrepancy standard, the pre-2006
regulations made explicit the possibility of IDEA eligibility
for a child achieving at grade level or higher whose
achievement was nevertheless far below his or her
ability. 233 The Department of Education has declared that
failure in grade must not be used as a standard for
eligibility, 234 but it appears likely that RTI screening will
never identify the child achieving at grade level who has an
achievement discrepancy and could benefit from special
education instruction. 235 The National Joint Committee on
Learning Disabilities identified this as a serious potential
difficulty with RTI, stating in its Report, "A particular
concern is whether RTI is prone to systematic errors in
identifying students with LD. For example, the

231. Tonya R. Moon et al., Twice-Exceptional Students, in EDUCATING
INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES: IDEIA 2004 AND BEYOND, supra note 185, at 295,

296-97.
232. Id. at 298.
233. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.541(a) (2007) (superseded).
234. Letter to Anonymous, 41 Individuals with Disabilities Educ. L. Rep.
212 (U.S. Dep't of Educ. 2004). The duty to identify, locate, and evaluate all
children suspected of being children with disabilities applies "even though they
are advancing from grade to grade." 34 C.F.R. § 300.111(c)(1) (2008). Programs
such as Advanced Placement and International Baccalaureate must not
discriminate against qualified students with learning or other disabilities.
STEPHANE MONROE, OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., ACCESS BY
STUDENTS WITH DISABILITIES TO ACCELERATED PROGRAMS (2007),
http://www.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-20071226.html.
235. Kavale et al., supra note 191 ("What is also clear is that eliminating
IQ-achievement discrepancy would result in a significant number of students
with SLD not being identified when using only a relative discrepancy or low
achievement criterion for determining eligibility."); see Townsend, supra note
175, at 264 ("[The RTI] approach becomes a ceiling on the ability of students
with high potential, who can achieve scores in the average range in spite of
their learning disability, preventing them from getting the help they need to
realize their full potential.").
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underachievement criterion may exclude '236
some high-ability
students with LD from special education.
A second problem is simply that of compliance with RTI
requirements when the program is implemented on a large
scale. The method mandates that teachers use only
scientifically supported instructional techniques; school
personnel must monitor individual children's progress
rigorously. 237 There is no clear protocol for what should
happen if a teacher deviates from the techniques, say by
providing negative reinforcement 238 when positive is called
for or failing to enter timely progress reports. Must the
intervention start over from the time of the failure to
comply? An intervention conducted without integrity could
result in the child's failing to make progress not because of
the presence of a learning disability but because of
inadequate instruction. 239 There is little guidance so far
from courts or other sources of legal interpretation on the
remedy for program integrity failures, although in an
instance in which a school district failed to "follow the
prescribed protocol for an RTI process" before concluding
236. See Nat'l Joint Comm. on Learning Disabilities, supra note 221, at 253
("These students, by compensating with their intellectual strengths and making
good use of support services, often manage to achieve within the normal range
and, therefore, are unlikely to receive the early individualized instruction that
would enable them to make academic progress consistent with their abilities.").
But see Moon et al., supra note 231, at 302 (suggesting use of RTI in
combination with other strategies in identifying gifted children with LD). The
authors do not explain how bright children who compensate for their
weaknesses with skilled guesswork or other mechanisms to perform at an
average level will be identified and provided assistance to become better
learners.
237. Even the most rigorous program does not eliminate individual
judgment. See Gerber, supra note 197 ("Even teachers of small intervention
groups make decisions to continue or adjust instruction based on evaluation of
quality (e.g., automaticity or fluency) as well as accuracy of students' responses.
Such decisions and the choices that follow cannot be fully programmed in
advance without ignoring potentially meaningful individual differences among
students."). One source, however, comments that fidelity to protocol is a
problem with non-RTI evaluation mechanisms as well. See Reschly, supra note
190 ("Implementation fidelity, however, is not a problem unique to RTI.").
238. Yelling, for example. Professor Gerber politely notes, "Teachers differ
as individuals despite the quality of their professional preparation ... like their
students, they cannot be made identical." Gerber, supra note 197.
239. See Gresham, supra note 181 ("[Flailure to find significant treatment
effects might be explained by poor component integrity over time, by poor daily
or session integrity, or both.").
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that a child had no specific learning disability, a challenge
was sustained by the Pennsylvania State Educational
Agency's due process hearing appeals review officer, who
awarded tuition reimbursement to the parents for a private
program for the child. 240 Implementation of RTI is also
likely to be costly in terms of teacher training time and
purchased programs, 241 although there may be long-term
savings if children are kept from needing expensive services
2 42
later.

Exacerbating compliance problems is the reality that the
evidence supporting the effectiveness of RTI interventions
across the curriculum and across age ranges is surprisingly
incomplete. Although various interventions are scientifically
validated with regard to reading mechanics, interventions
directed
to
reading comprehension
have
proven
ineffective, 243 and specialized instruction in other areas
240. In re the Educ. Assign. of S.K, a Student in the Upper Darby Sch. Dist.,
106 LRP 60495, (Pa. Dep't of Educ. Sept. 2006), Special Educ. Op. No. 1769
(Sept. 2006).
241. Council for Exceptional Children, supra note 209 ("Implementing RTI
is a substantial undertaking. Staff may need professional development in the
RTI process as well as in research-based instruction and progress monitoring.
To assist teachers, some schools provide training and manuals on acceptable
interventions. In addition, schools may bring in outside support, such as a
university, to help teachers learn and teach curriculum."). One source cites
indicates that twenty hours of training plus weekly followup sessions will be
required for tutors, and forty hours of baseline training for classroom teachers.
Gerber, supra note 197 (collecting studies).
242. See Gresham, supra note 181 (discussing cost-benefit comparison).
243. BETH C. GAMSE, ET AL., NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. EVALUATION & REG'L
ASSISTANCE, INST. OF EDUC. Scis., READING FIRST IMPACT STUDY: INTERIM

REPORT, at xiv (Apr. 2008), availableat
http://ies.ed.gov/ncee/pdf/20084016.pdf ("On average, Reading First did not
improve students' reading comprehension. The program did not increase the
percentages of students in grades one, two, or three, whose reading
comprehension scores were at or above grade level. In each of the three grades,
fewer than half of the students in the Reading First schools were reading at or
above grade level."); see Sam Dillon, An Initiative on Reading Is Rated
Ineffective,
N.Y.
TIMES,
May
2,
2008,
at
A12,
available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/02/education/O2reading.html?pagewanted=pri
nt (summarizing and discussing findings of Interim Report). The Reading First
program, which is the principal innovation in reading instruction associated
with the No Child Left Behind Initiative, has been criticized for cronyism,
among other things. See Kathleen Conn, The Evolution of K-12 Educational
Malpractice Claims: Will the "Reading First" Scandals Influence Statutory
Causes of Action Under NCLBA and IDEIA?, 221 EDUC. L. REP. 21 (2007).
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remains unproven. 244 It is true that reading is the most
common area in which learning disabilities manifest
themselves, 245 but there is a serious gap regarding
scientifically validated instruction in other areas.246
Problems also exist with respect to implementation of RTI
methods in the upper grades. Research is limited regarding
appropriate protocols for RTI for children beyond their first
few years in school. 247 Some authorities are skeptical about
248
whether RTI methods can work for older children at all.
244. For a compilation of favorable results in trials of math intervention, see
Lynn S. Fuchs et al., Response to Intervention, in EDUCATING INDIVIDUALS WITH
DISABILITIES: IDEIA 2004 AND BEYOND, supra note 185, at 115, 125-27. The
authors note that validation of protocols for written language and science
remains to be accomplished. Id. at 124. Some other experts regard math RTI as
a work in progress. David Chard et al., Systems of Instruction and Assessment
to Improve Mathematics Achievement for Students with Disabilities: The
Potential and Promise of RTI, in EDUCATING INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES:
IDEIA 2004 AND BEYOND, supra, at 225, 228 ("Most research and development

in RTI implementation and evaluation have taken place in early reading
education. Our interest is in promoting similar efforts in mathematics.
However, developing RTI models in mathematics education will be a formidable
challenge."). Other authorities are more skeptical about the scientific support
for RTI processes in general. See Jack A. Naglieri & Alan S. Kaufman, IDEIA
and Specific Learning Disabilities, in EDUCATING INDIVIDUALS WITH
DISABILITIES: IDEIA 2004 AND BEYOND, supra, at 163, 189 ("The evidence
examined by Fuchs et al. (2003) and Naglieri and Crockett (2005) suggest that
there is little evidence to demonstrate the utility of RTI."); see also Kavale et al.,
supra note 191 (describing support for use of RTI with regard to anything but
phonemic awareness in young children as inadequate).
245. Spear-Swerling, supra note 185, at 271 ("[O]ver 90% of children
classified as LD prior to fifth grade are identified based primarily on problems
in reading.") (citing 1992 data).
246. Scruggs, supra note 192 ("[I]ntensive instruction can improve reading
skills, but this does not 'cure' the learning disability, which may have a number
of other manifestations. That is, deficits in sustained attention, semantic
memory, organizational skills, perceptual motor skills, or social interactions
could lead to problems in a number of other school tasks ....

").

247. Spear-Swerling, supra note 185, at 287; see Scruggs, supra note 192
("Presently, the model addresses primarily reading in primary grades, and tells
us little about how learning disabilities might be evaluated at higher grade
levels, and when the problems emerge primarily as failures in content area
learning."); Semrud-Clikeman, supra note 197 ("Most of the research has
centered on children in kindergarten and first grade classrooms. There is very
little empirical evidence that this program is appropriate for children at older
ages. Prior to implementation of this program for all children it would be very
appropriate to conduct studies with children in middle school and high school.").
248. See Michele Goyette-Ewing & Sherin Stahl, New Individuals with
Disabilities Improvement Act and Psychological Assessment, in EDUCATING

138

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57

When there is no scientifically validated protocol
with
249
which to comply, implementation is impossible.
A third problem is that of affording parents and
children their important procedural protections while
implementing RTI. For example, under IDEA parents are
entitled to notice and the opportunity to give or withhold
consent to evaluation. 250 RTI is a method of evaluation, and
the fact that the regulations providing for RTI are listed
under the "Evaluation" heading implies that notice of use of
RTI evaluation methods must be provided. 251 Screenings for
instructional purposes are not considered evaluations, but
RTI involves much more than simple screening. 252 RTI is an
educational methodology, not an interpretation of legal
requirements, so there is no clear point at which notice
must be given to parents in the RTI protocols themselves.
An additional procedural right under the law is that a
parent may request an evaluation for special education
eligibility at any time. 253 It is not clear exactly what
happens if that occurs during RTI. A report of the National
Research Center on Learning Disabilities notes: "A
potentially difficult situation might arise if parents exercise
their right to request an evaluation and LEAs [school
districts] do not have clearly described steps, components,
procedures, and criteria for SLD determination and for
whether and how a student's response to scientific,
research-based intervention is included. '' 254 Parents also
INDIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES: IDEIA 2004 AND BEYOND, supra note 185, at 421,

432 ("Will we be using a wait-to-fail approach with these older children, if we
depend on RTI as the primary tool for determining a learning disability?").
Others are more sanguine. See Saylor Heidmann, Reading Assessment and
IDEIA, in EDUCATING INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES: IDEIA 2004 AND BEYOND,

supra, at 435, 447-50 (relying on anecdotal information).
249. See Jennifer H. Lindstrom et al., Assessment and Eligibility of Students
with Disabilities,in EDUCATING INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES: IDEIA 2004 AND
BEYOND, supra note 185, at 197, 204.
250. 34 C.F.R. § 300.304(a) (2008); see § 300.509.
251. See 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.301-.311.
252. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.302. (covering screening for instructional purposes).
253. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.301(b).
254. NAT'L RES. CTR. ON LEARNING DISABILITIES, RESPONSIVENESS TO
INTERVENTION IN CONJUNCTION WITH LEARNING DISABILITY DETERMINATION

(Winter 2007),
http://www.nrcld.org/resource-kit/general/RTIbrief2OO7.pdf.
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have the right to demand an independent educational
evaluation if they disagree with the public school's
evaluation of their child. 255 It is difficult to imagine how
this would include RTI, so IQ-discrepancy or some other
method would need to be retained for this purpose. 256 What
is more, neither the United States Department of
Education 257 nor professional sources 258 anticipate that RTI
will be used as the sole criterion for a finding of special
education eligibility, but if IQ test-discrepancy methods are
abandoned, one cannot tell what the other criteria will be.
Timelines are an important part of IDEA procedural
protections. The general time limit for evaluation is sixty
days after receipt of parental consent. 25 9 School districts
have to adhere to the time limits in determining specific
learning disability unless the parents agree to a written
extension. 260 RTI can be a lengthy process, even if the lapse
of time is to some degree compensated by educational
benefit some children will receive. Judicial remedies exist
for delay in determining special education eligibility. For
example, in Board of Education v. L.M., the Court of
255. 34 C.F.R. § 300.502 (2008). The independent evaluation must be at
public expense unless the school district requests a hearing and demonstrates
that its evaluation is appropriate. § 300.502(b).
256. Another mystery is how to apply RTI to determine eligibility for private
school students. School districts have the obligation to identify, locate, and
evaluate those students by undertaking activities similar to those undertaken
for public school students, 20 U.S.C.A. § 1412(a)(10)(A)(ii) (West Supp. 2008),
but lack the ability to modify the private schools' general education to embrace
RTI methods.
257. U.S. Dep't of Educ., supra note 211, at C-6 ("[An RTI process does not
replace the need for a comprehensive evaluation."); see 20 U.S.C.A. § 1414(b)(2)
(West Supp. 2008) ("In conducting the evaluation, the local educational agency
shall . . .use a variety of assessment tools and strategies to gather relevant
functional, developmental, and academic information . . . [and] not use any
single measure or assessment as the sole criterion for determining whether a
child is a child with a disability ...").
258. See NAT'L RESEARCH CTR. ON LEARNING DISABILITIES, supra note 254
("RTI is introduced into the statute as one part of the evaluation, eligibility determination, individualized education program, and educational placement
procedures, not as the only evaluation procedure. The inference is that SLD
determination is not based on a sole criterion of a child's response to an
intervention.").
259. 34 C.F.R. § 300.301(c)(1)(i) (2008). States may enact differeni time
limits. § 300.301(c)(1)(ii).
260. 34 C.F.R. § 300.309(c).
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Appeals for the Sixth Circuit ruled that a child should
receive a compensatory education remedy to permit a child
whose evaluation was delayed during his third and fourth
grade years "to catch up to his peers." 261 The court adopted
a standard for actionable violations that "the claimant
'must show that school officials overlooked clear signs of
disability and were negligent in failing to order testing, or
that there was no rational justification for not deciding to
evaluate.' 26 2 This standard may be met in some cases when
a school system uses RTI but takes no other steps on behalf
of the child while time continues to elapse. On the other
hand, the delay actually has to cause harm for relief to be
proper. In Lesesne v. District of Columbia, the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia ruled that the parent
would not prevail in a case over failure to meet an
evaluation deadline unless the parent could demonstrate
that a child suffered harm from the delay. 263 In a situation
where the child has received RTI but has not received any
other form of evaluation or been deemed eligible for special
education, claims based on delay may be difficult to sustain
if the child obtained benefit from the RTI comparable to
what would have been received in special education. When
that is not the case, a remedy is appropriate if timelines
have been violated.
The fourth problem with RTI is the interaction of
disciplinary protections with delays in identification of the
child as a child with a disability. 26 4 Under IDEA, students
who are eligible for special education cannot have their
services completely terminated, no matter what conduct
they may have been accused of or engaged in. 265 If the child
is suspended or otherwise removed from his or her
educational placement for ten days in the same school year,
ongoing educational services have to be provided; although
the services may be in a different setting, they must enable

261. 478 F.3d 307, 316 (6th Cir. 2007).
262. Id. at 313 (quoting Clay T. v. Walton County Sch. Dist., 952 F. Supp.
817, 823 (M.D. Ga. 1997)).
263. 447 F.3d 828 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
264. The same problem, of course, arises for children who are ultimately not
found eligible for special education if their needs are remediated during the RTI
process.
265. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1412(a)(1)(A) (West Supp. 2008).
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the child to participate in the general education curriculum
and to continue to make progress on individualized
educational program (IEP) goals. 266 Every child who is
removed is entitled to receive a functional behavioral
assessment and behavior intervention services and
modifications. 267 Before making any long-term change in
the child's placement, the IEP team must determine
whether the misconduct was a manifestation of the child's
disability. 268 If the conduct was a manifestation, the school
has to conduct a functional behavioral assessment and
modify the child's behavior plan as necessary. 269 Unless the
child's conduct involved weapons, drugs, or infliction of
serious bodily injury, the school must return the child to his
or her previous placement. 270 Even in the weapons, drugs,
and serious injury cases, the removal is limited272to forty-five
school days. 27 ' Various appeal rights also exist.
These rights in connection with the discipline process
are extremely important to children and their parents.
Though the law says that the rights apply in limited
instances for a child who has not yet been determined to be
a child with a disability when the school had knowledge
that the child was a child with a disability, 273 the
applicability of that provision is far from certain. The
United States Department of Education has taken the
position that participation in RTI, standing alone, is not
enough to supply the basis in knowledge to trigger the
discipline protections. 274 Parents can be expected to resist
the use of RTI processes that delay the eligibility
determination or entirely prevent their children from being
deemed eligible if they perceive the children as vulnerable
to student discipline that could result in suspension or
expulsion from school without the protection afforded

266. 34 C.F.R. § 300.530(d)(1)(i) (2008).
267. § 300.530(d)(1)(ii).
268. § 300.530(e).
269. Id.
270. § 300.530(f)-(g).
271. § 300.530(g) (2008).
272. 34 C.F.R. § 300.532.
273. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.534.
274. U.S. Dep't of Educ., supra note 211, at F-3.
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students who have received a determination of IDEA
eligibility. State educational agencies or local school board
could, of course, avoid any conflicts on this topic by
voluntarily extending protections similar to those that
apply to IDEA-eligible children to all children, or at least to
all those in RTI. It is hardly consistent with sound
educational methods to have any students-those officially
considered to have disabilities and those not-out of school
for long periods of 275
time with no opportunity to make
educational progress.
5. RTI's Role in the Eligibility Mess. Despite the
apparent drawbacks of RTI, the IQ-discrepancy controversy
and RTI response to it would not necessarily present a
problem for IDEA eligibility policy. Indeed, these
developments might be an opportunity to set learning
disabilities intervention on a sounder footing while
benefiting students whose learning problems do not show
up in an IQ profile. The developments thus may advance in
part the services-for-all-who-need-them approach embodied
in the not-quite-so-special education model. The difficulty-and the reasons things are now a mess and may get
worse-is the likely exclusion of children who could benefit
significantly from learning disabilities services but who
perform well enough on screenings that they are not
selected for RTI, and the inclusion of children in the early
phases of RTI for protracted periods when they should be
receiving more intense services. The mess will become
worse if schools attempt to implement RTI on a grand scale
without sufficient personnel training or preparation, or if
the schools violate the internal tenets of RTI by applying it
to groups of children for which there is no scientifically
validated intervention available. Schools must also

275. Even if only the most important protections were afforded, such as the
right to continued services in an alternative setting during periods of
suspension, children would benefit and parental pressure for rapid eligibility
determinations would diminish. No warranties are made regarding the political
palatability of this proposal, but it may be noted that after significant agitation
to eliminate disciplinary protections for children with disabilities in the debates
leading up to the 2004 Reauthorization, the changes made were fairly modest
and the legislation even contains a provision expressing disapproval of zerotolerance policies. See Weber, supra note 23, at 34-39 (discussing, inter alia, 20
U.S.C.A. § 1415(k)(1)(A) (West Supp. 2008), which calls for consideration of
unique circumstances on case-by-case basis when disciplining students with
disabilities).
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determine how to protect procedural rights as they
implement RTI, and they need to afford disciplinary
protections to all children who are suspected of having
disabilities, which likely is the entire category of children in
RTI and a number of others besides.
C. African-American Overrepresentation
Caselaw trends and changes in learning disabilities
methodology join with a third major
evaluation
development in producing the IDEA eligibility mess. That
development is the belated awareness that AfricanAmerican children are significantly overrepresented in
some special education eligibility categories. This
realization has led to legislative action, well-founded
concerns about discrimination, and overdue attention to the
problem of separate settings for children in the special
education system. There are those who would respond to
the development by further limiting special education
eligibility. A better approach is to address the problems of
isolation, stigma, and low expectations directly.
The United States Department of Education reports
that there are major differences among racial and ethnic
groups with regard to special education eligibility,
particularly with regard to mental retardation and
emotional disturbance. According to the Annual Report on
the Implementation of the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act, statistics for the most recent year available
demonstrated that "the percentage [of students] receiving
special education (i.e., risk index) was largest for American
Indian/Alaska Native students (13.8 percent), followed by
black (12.4 percent), white (8.7 percent), Hispanic (8.2
(4.5 percent)
Islander
percent) and Asian/Pacific
students. ' 276 The report continued: "Black students were 3.0
times more likely to receive special education and related
services for mental retardation and 2.3 times more likely to
receive special education and related services for emotional

276. U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., 1 TWENTY-SEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS
ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT
38 (2005), availableat http://www.ed.gov/about/reports/annual/osep/2005/partsb-c/27th-vol-l.pdf (discussing data for students ages 6-21).
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groups
racial/ethnic
all
other
disturbance277 than
combined."
This information is not new, but instead reflects longterm data trends. Two well-known authorities describe the
situation in the following terms:
[T]rends include the following: (a) pronounced and persistent
racial disparities in identification between white and black
children in the categories of mental retardation and emotional
disturbance, compared with far less disparity in the category of
specific learning disabilities; (b) a minimal degree of racial
disparity in medically diagnosed disabilities [such as deafness,
blindness, and orthopedic impairment] as compared with
subjective cognitive disabilities; (c) dramatic differences in the
incidence of disability from one state to the next; and (d) gross
disparities between blacks and Hispanics, and between black boys
the categories of mentally
and girls, in identification rates for
27 8
retarded and emotionally disturbed.

The ethnic disparities, particularly the overrepresentation
of African-Americans in the mental retardation and
attracted
have
categories,
disturbance
emotional
congressional attention. The 2004 IDEA Reauthorization
requires states to have "policies and procedures designed to
or
overidentification
inappropriate
the
prevent
277. Id. at 40. There is disproportional representation of other ethnic groups
as well, but the pattern is more geographically scattered and indicates
statistical underrepresentation as well. Daniel J. Losen & Kevin G. Welner,

Disabling Discrimination in Our Public Schools: Comprehensive Legal
Challenges to Inappropriate and Inadequate Special Education Services for
Minority Children, 36 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 407, 412 (2001) ("Although
African Americans appear to bear the brunt of overidentification, the evidence
indicates that all minority groups are vulnerable to discrimination in
identification for special education. For example, Hispanics, Native Americans,
and Asian Pacific Americans are each overrepresented in mental retardation
classifications at more than three times the rate of whites in at least one state.
In most states, however, Hispanics and Asian Pacific Americans are more likely
to be underrepresented.") (relying on data compiled by Thomas Parrish).
278. Daniel J. Losen & Gary Orfield, Racial Inequity in Special Education,
in RACIAL INEQUITY IN SPECIAL EDUCATION supra note 48, at xv, xxiii. Other
disparities appear even wbhn these particular disparities vanish. California
eliminated overrepresentaulon of African-Americans classed as students with
mild mental retardation over the period from 1980 to 1994, but
overrepresentation of African-Americans identified as having learning
disabilities increased substantially. Donald P. Oswald et al., Community and

School Predictors of Overrepresentation of Minority Children in Special
Education, in RACIAL INEQUITY IN SPECIAL EDUCATION supra note 48, at 1, 3.
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disproportionate representation by race and ethnicity of
children as children with disabilities. '279 States must collect
and examine student data to determine if significant
disproportionality on the basis of race and ethnicity is
taking place in the state or its local school districts with
regard to special education identification, placement in
particular settings, and incidence, duration, and type of
disciplinary actions. 280 If there is a determination that
significant disproportionality is occurring with respect to
identification or placement, the state has to provide for the
review and, if appropriate, the revision of policies,
procedures, and practices used in identification and
placement. 281 The state must also require any local school
district found to have a significant disproportionality to
reserve the maximum amount of funds (that is, 15% of
federal special education payments) to provide early
intervening services to assist children not yet identified as
282
being children with disabilities.
Disparities by themselves
do not
demonstrate
discrimination, but some anomalies in the picture, such as the
absence of significant African-American overrepresentation
in medically determinable disability categories and wide
differences by location in identification of African-Americans,
support the inference that discriminatory identification is
occurring. Mr. Losen and Professor Orfield conclude: "The
data on disproportionate representation is compatible with
the theory that systemic racial discrimination is a
contributing factor where disparities [in special education
identification] are substantial. ' 283 Poverty, by itself, does
not fully explain the racial disparities. 284 Ethnicity remains
a significant predictor of cognitive disability identification
even when poverty and wealth are controlled for in the
statistical analysis. 285 In addition, the problem of the
279. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1412(a)(24) (West Supp. 2008).
280. 20 U.S.C.A.

§ 1418(d)(1).

281. § 1418(d)(2)(A). The revision of policies has to be publicly reported.
§ 1418(d)(2)(C).
282. § 1418(d)(2)(B). See generally supra text accompanying notes 61-62,
214-15 (discussing early intervening services).
283. Losen & Orfield, supra note 278, at xxiii.
284. Id.
285. Id. at xxiv.
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"instructional casualty" is likely to be especially pronounced
in a situation in which a child is racially or culturally
isolated.28 6 This conclusion is supported by the reality that
African-American children in wealthier school districts with
more children of high socio-economic status are more likely
than Africanto be identified as mentally retarded
28 7
American children in other locales.
Separate schooling of children with disabilities-that is,
education in specialized classrooms out of the mainstreamis more often the case when the children with disabilities
are African-American. The Department of Education
reports that: "Compared to students with disabilities from
other racial/ethnic groups, black students with disabilities
were the least likely to be educated in the regular classroom
for most of the school day (38.6 percent). '288 Conversely,
"White students with disabilities were the most likely to be
educated in the regular classroom for most of the school day
(54.7 percent)." 28 9 Very isolated settings are particularly
common for African-American children with disabilities:
"Black students with disabilities were more likely than
students with disabilities from other racial/ethnic groups to
be educated outside the regular classroom more than 60
percent of the day (28.1 percent). They were also more
in [completely] separate environments
likely to be educated
'290
(5.2 percent).
These isolated settings impose harm on the children
placed in them. To take the example of children whose
behavior disorders manifest themselves in antisocial
conduct, "forced segregation with antisocial peers ... often
reinforces problem behavior. ' 291 Moreover, since AfricanAmerican children are disproportionately identified as
special education-eligible, special education practices that
286. See supra text accompanying
casualties").

note 223 (discussing "instructional

287. Losen & Welner, supra note 277, at 415-16 (relying on data compiled by
Donald P. Oswald).
288. U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., supra note 276, at 48.

289. Id.
290. Id.
291. David Osher et al., Schools Make a Difference: The Overrepresentation
of African American Youth in Special Education and the Juvenile Justice
System, in RACIAL INEQUITY IN SPECIAL EDUCATION, supra note 48, at 93, 96.
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an effective
placements become
separate
employ
children in
African-American
to
segregate
mechanism
than place
rather
placements,
single-race special education
292
classrooms.
mainstream
integrated
racially
in
them
293
Isolated and isolating placements need not be the rule.
They appear to exist in large part because of the absence of
resources to enable children with high needs to learn in
their ordinary classrooms. One source observes that
"racially isolated, high-poverty urban schools may be using
they lack supports for
special education as triage because
294
placements."
educational
inclusive
Professor Garda, who has written extensively on the
topic of overrepresentation, believes that a redefinition of
the "needs special education" component of the IDEA eligibility
standard is necessary to solve the overrepresentation
problem. 295 He would limit IDEA eligibility to students who
need "significant instructional adaptations that are not
provided to all students, regardless of disability."296 This

292. Losen & Welner, supra note 277, at 407 ("[A]s a result of misdiagnosis
and inappropriate labeling, special education is far too often a vehicle for the
segregation and degradation of minority children.").
293. One prominent expert on disability law has challenged the legal
presumption favoring educational settings in which children with disabilities
are integrated with those who do not have disabilities. Ruth Colker, The
Disability IntegrationPresumption: Thirty Years Later, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 789
(2006). For a response, see Mark C. Weber, A Nuanced Approach to the
Disability IntegrationPresumption, 156 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 174 (2007),
http://www.pennumbra.com/responses, 10-2007/Weber.pdf.
294. Edward Garcia Fierros & James W. Conroy, Double Jeopardy: An
Exploration of Restrictiveness and Race in Special Education, in RACIAL
INEQUITY IN SPECIAL EDUCATION, supra note 48, at 39, 40.
295. Garda, supra note 12, at 1074 ("[W]ithout fundamental changes to, and
a proper understanding of, the "needs special education" eligibility criteria, the
educational paradigm adopted in the [2004 Reauthorization] cannot take root,
and the eligibility problems will persist.").
296. Id. Professor Garda would further rule out a student's eligibility for
special education "until all available accommodations and regular education
interventions have proven ineffective." Id. at 1074-75. Though intended to force
general education to take responsibility for students of all cultures and
ethnicities by individualizing instruction, this suggestion, will, I fear, take to an
extreme the wait-to-fail approach that has been so severely criticized regarding
learning disabilities evaluation. See supra text accompanying note 60
(criticizing wait-to-fail approach). Professor Garda would use a below-average
performance standard, rather than a standard of failing, see Garda, supra note
12, at 1129; supra note 11, at 491-512, but so many children are below average
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perspective locates the problem in the fact of IDEA
eligibility, rather than in the reality of separate placements
and low expectations once IDEA eligibility is established.
Professor Garda makes a case that misidentifying a child as
having a disability is harmful because of stigma and loss of
self-esteem, 297 and anecdotal accounts, such as that of Billy
C. Hawkins, a college president who was labeled mentally
retarded as a child, confirm this view. 298 But stigma and
loss of self-esteem are by no means solely the results, and
certainly are not the necessary results, of eligibility for
special education services. All students perceived as
different are vulnerable to mistreatment that imposes
stigma and psychological harm. 299 The sensible response is
for schools to act aggressively to keep teachers and peers
from imposing stigma on those students, 300 whether the
students are identified for special education or not. 301 And
there is good ground to doubt that the critical factor in
imposition of stigma or low expectations is the legal
identification for special education. 30 2 Students who are
struggling to keep up with the class will be labeled "stupid"
(or worse) irrespective of how the law classifies them for
purposes of statutory entitlements. 30 3
(half, except in Lake Woebegone) that in practice the standard will likely
become that of failing or nearly so.
297. See Garda, supra note 12, at 1082-83.
298. See Losen & Welner, supranote 277, at 411.
299. See David M. Engel, Law, Culture, and Children with Disabilities:
EducationalRights and the Construction of Difference, 1991 DUKE L.J. 166, 184
(discussing imposition of stigma on persons with disabilities).
300. See generally Mark C. Weber, Disability Harassment in the Public
Schools, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1079, 1155-58 (2002) (discussing steps to
prevent and remedy harassment on the basis of disability).
301. If the student is not found eligible for special education, some of the
legal remedies for harassment will not be available, because they are furnished
under IDEA. See id. at 1110-19 (discussing IDEA remedies).
302. See Arceneaux, supra note 46, at 244 ("Although the term stigma or
stigmatization is often used to describe an outcome of special education,
particularly for minorities, there is a lack of empirical data to support this
finding separate from consolidated studies with other variables.").
303. Some personal narrative may support this point. I attended Catholic
grade schools in the Milwaukee area in the 1960s. There were no special
education classes in the schools I attended and no children identified as special
education eligible or given disability classifications. Nevertheless, it was
obvious to everyone which children were struggling to learn. They were
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If revised or reinterpreted eligibility standards keep
children who are floundering in general education classes
from a legal entitlement to assistance, the educational
problems they encounter will simply become more
intractable. Difficulties that students experience with the
general education curriculum reflect problems that
desperately need to be addressed. 30 4 At the present time,
the only system that confers an entitlement to services and
the procedural protections to enforce the entitlement is the
special education system.30 5 General education, as currently
constituted, is not up to the task. One analysis of studies
concludes that: "Keeping minorities who are already
performing poorly in the general education systems that
failed them (or inappropriately returning them there from
educational
education) perpetuates inferior
special
outcomes for these students." 30 6 Even that analysis
assumes that the students will stay in school if the
entitlement to special education disappears, an outcome
that is highly unlikely. African-American children who
manifest mental disabilities are highly vulnerable to
ruthlessly stigmatized and frequently became the victims of harassment. It is
hard to imagine that the mistreatment would have been any worse had they
been given a formal disability designation, and their prospects certainly would
have improved had they been afforded support in their schooling as a matter of
entitlement. There are, of course, limits to the value of this observation. In any
given case, an official designation may still have a harmful effect. But much
depends on what the consequences of the designation will be, and if the
consequence is an entitlement to effective services rather than isolation, the
designation is worth the disadvantage, particularly if the school aggressively
corrects any peer and teacher mistreatment of children who are so designated
as well as those who are not.
304. Losen and Welner note that "Special education can provide tremendous
benefits to children who need supports and services." Losen & Welner, supra
note 277, at 407.
305. As Losen and Welner acknowledge, Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S.
275 (2001), places out of reach individual litigation under the disparate impact
regulations enforcing title VI of the Civil Rights Act. See id. at 409. Their
suggested alternative, litigation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to enforce the
regulations, see id. at 449-51, seems less than promising in light of recent cases
restricting the applicability of that cause of action, notably Gonzaga Univ. v.
Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002), and City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 544 U.S.
113 (2005). See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 570 (5th ed. 2007)
("Together, ...the Supreme Court's two most recent decisions-City of Rancho
Palos Verdes v. Abrams and Gonzaga University v. Doe-reveal a Court very
much seeking to narrow the ability to use §1983 to enforce federal statutes.").
306. Oswald et al., supra note 278, at 3.
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suspension and expulsion from school unless they have the
protections that IDEA gives
children who are deemed
30 7
eligible for special education.
The true problems are not those of special education
identification. They are isolation, low expectations, and
poor outcomes, simpliciter.308 Even Professor Garda
acknowledges that the negative effects of incorrect labels on
children are "compounded by their placement in classes
separate
from
their peers with less demanding
curriculums. ' 309 Rather than redefining any component of
the special education eligibility standard to eliminate a
child's entitlement to services appropriate to his or her
educational needs, the prescription should be to improve
the quality of special education services and deliver them to
children who remain in the general education classroom,
with the services provided so intensely that the students

307. See Floyd D. Weatherspoon, Racial Justice and Equity for AfricanAmerican Males in the American Educational System: A Dream Forever
Deferred, 29 N.C. CENT. L.J. 1, 29 (2006) ("Unfortunately, the IDEA has been at
times a double-edged sword. .

.

. [Ilt has been overly used to label and

disproportionately place African-American males in special education programs
and out of mainstream educational instruction. At the same time, AfricanAmerican males with mental disabilities have been suspended and expelled
from school in lieu of receiving services required by the IDEA.") (footnotes
omitted).
308. See Reschly, supra note 190 ("The most vulnerable feature in modern
special education for persons with high incidence disabilities is insufficient
documentation of positive benefits to children and youth .... Moreover, when
positive outcomes are documented in LD, the magnitude is modest."); see also
Beth Harry et al., Of Rocks and Soft Places: Using Qualitative Methods to
Investigate Disproportionality,in RACIAL INEQUITY IN SPECIAL EDUCATION, supra
note 48, at 71, 72 (noting that disproportionate special education identification
by race "is problematic .... [in] that there continues to be doubt that placement
in special education programs results in beneficial outcomes for many
students"). Positive outcomes appear to vary by race. The Department of
Education reports that 59.1% of white children with disabilities graduate from
high school with a regular diploma, while only 36.2% of African-American
children with disabilities do so. The respective dropout rates are 29.9% and
41.7%. U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., supra note 276, at 53; Osher et al., supra note 291,
at 94 ("While academic outcomes are poor for all youth with [emotional and
behavioral disorders], they are particularly dismal for African Americans.").
309. Garda, supra note 12, at 1083. Professor Garda further notes that
"[o]ne final explanation for African-American students' poor outcomes from
special education is that eligible African-American children are more likely
than their white counterparts to be placed in restrictive, segregated settings
apart from general education students and the general curriculum." Id. at 1085.
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meet the same expectations for achievement as everyone
else is meeting.
That being said, a number of incremental steps
addressed to overrepresentation may be appropriate. State
funding formulas that do not distribute special education
funds to school districts based on the numbers of students
they identify for special education are less associated with
overrepresentation of minorities than per-capita formulas
are. 310 The reporting and early intervening services
spending requirements recently put into place by Congress
strict
beneficial. 311 Nevertheless,
may also prove
proportionality of representation by race is likely to remain
an unrealistic goal, if only because of the real, if sometimes
overstated, contribution of poverty to disability. One
prominent critic of overrepresentation concedes that "in
high-poverty districts, strict numeric proportionality may
mean that12 some children in need are not receiving
services."

3

D. Summary
The law of eligibility under IDEA is indeed a mess. The
recent caselaw is frequently unhelpful, and sometimes it is
downright harmful in that it keeps children Congress
intended to benefit from the law from receiving the law's
benefits. The RTI movement holds promise for students
who have learning disabilities, but there are many
unanswered questions and perhaps some unanswerable
ones in extending RTI methodology as far as is being
proposed. Finally, there is an air of racial discrimination in
the way African-Americans are treated in the special
education system, including eligibility and placement
determinations, just as there is in the way AfricanAmericans are treated in the educational system in general.
What is to be done?

310. Parrish, supra note 48, at 16.
311. See generally supra text accompanying notes 279-81 (describing recent
statutory initiatives addressing disparities). Garda remains skeptical. See
Garda, supra note 12, at 1100-01.
312. Thomas Hehir, IDEA and Disproportionality: Federal Enforcement,
Effective Advocacy, and Strategies for Change, in RACIAL INEQUITY IN SPECIAL
EDUCATION 219, 235 (Daniel J. Losen & Gary Orfield eds. 2002).
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IV. THE CLEANUP

I have already hinted at some of the steps that might be
needed-or at least some of those that must be avoided-if
the problems with the law of special education eligibility
are to be resolved. What needs to be done includes
rectifying the caselaw, moving cautiously on RTI, and
addressing the problems raised by racial overrepresentation
not as problems of IDEA eligibility, but as problems in
connection with what happens once a child is IDEA eligible.
A. Reforming the Caselaw on Eligibility
The solution to the problems posed by the caselaw does
not lie in changing the three-part eligibility definition.
Except for the difficulty with the social maladjustment
category, which can be fixed in other ways, the first part,
which includes the disability classifications themselves, 313
poses little difficulty. The second part, the "adversely
affects . . . educational performance" term found in all but
the learning disability definition, 314 is also not problematic
as long as it is read in its federally-minted, unadorned form.
There is no basis to transform it into "significantly affects
educational performance" or the equivalent. Using state
rules or policies to do so violates the supremacy of federal
law by defining out of a federal statute's coverage many of
the children the federal law protects. The same point
applies with regard to the third term, "by reason thereof,
needs special education and related services. '315 Putting a
restrictive reading on this term, whether one based in state
law or plucked from a school district's pleadings, undermines
the goals of IDEA to serve all children with disabilities, not
some imaginary subset of children who cannot be educated
in a general education classroom even with accommodations

313. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1401(3)(A)(i) (West Supp. 2008); 34 C.F.R. § 300.8(c)
(2008).
314. 34 C.F.R. § 300.8(c).
315. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1401(3)(A)(ii); 34 C.F.R. § 300.8(a).
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and supports. 316 Special education consists of those
accommodations and supports, 317 and federal law favors
delivering the accommodations and supports in the general
education classroom. 318 All children who require "specially
3 19
designed instruction . . . to meet [their] unique needs"
and "aids, services, and other supports" 320 because of one of
the conditions listed in the IDEA definition need special
education and related services by reason thereof, and are
IDEA-eligible. The courts should appreciate Professor
Hensel's insight that they are being led on a misguided
search for the "truly disabled," a search that IDEA does not
require, but that
instead threatens to undermine the goals
32
of the statute. '
There is a paradox in the fact that school districts fight
322
over the eligibility of children such as those in the Hood,
A.J'., 32 3 and Mr. L 32 4 cases. If the children are not eligible,
the school districts cannot use federal funds to serve them.

316. As noted, the original title of the federal statute was the Education for
All Handicapped Children Act. Even now, the first statement of purposes in the
legislation reads: 'The purposes of this [title] are-to ensure that all children
with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public education
...." 20 U.S.C.A. § 1400(d)(1)(A).

317. See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1401(29) ("The term 'special education' means
specially designed instruction, at no cost to parents, to meet the unique needs of
a child with a disability, including-(A) instruction conducted in the classroom,
in the home, in hospitals and institutions, and in other settings; and (B)
instruction in physical education."); 34 C.F.R. § 300.39(a) (2008) ("Special
education means specially designed instruction, at no cost to the parents, to
meet the unique needs of a child with a disability.. ").
318. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1412(a)(5)(A) ("[S]pecial classes, separate schooling, or
other removal of children with disabilities from the regular educational
environment [may] occur[] only when the nature or severity of the disability of a
child is such that education in regular classes with the use of supplementary
aids and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily.").
319. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1401(29).
320. 20 U.S.C.A.§ 1401(33). This extends to "aids, services, and supports
that are provided in regular education classes or other education-related
settings." Id.
321. See Hensel, supra note 10, at 1180 (discussed supra text accompanying
notes 175-79); see also supra text accompanying note 316 (emphasizing need to
serve "all children").
322. Hood v. Encinitas Union Sch. Dist., 486 F.3d 1099 (9th Cir. 2007).
323. Alvin Indep. Sch. Dist. v. A.D., 503 F.3d 378 (5th Cir. 2007).
324. Mr. I. v. Me. Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 55, 480 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2007).
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Depending on the funding formula the state employs, the
district will likely not be able to claim as much state
reimbursement as it otherwise could if the children are
excluded from the count of eligible children. 325 Yet the
schools still deny eligibility and literally make a federal
case out of it when the parents object. Perhaps the local
school districts are responding to state education
department regulators who are eager to decrease the
number of special education children by any means
possible. More likely, the school districts, even though they
claim to be willing to provide services through other
mechanisms, are unwilling to extend to these children the
legal entitlement to services, complete with the procedural
and discipline protections needed to put the entitlement
into force. It may be more convenient to serve or not serve
as the school district chooses, and to be free of statutory
notice, hearing, and continuation-of-services requirements.
But when that convenience is purchased at a price of
distorting the terms of the federal law, the courts should
step in.
As for other matters raised by the caselaw, the reach of
Rowley 326 should be limited to its definition-of-appropriateeducation context (as argued below, for other reasons its
reach ought to be restricted still further). Social
maladjustment is not a distinct category from emotional
disturbance. An amendment to the federal regulations to
eliminate the sentence containing the social maladjustment
term would be welcome, 327 but if that does not happen, the
courts should look to the definition of emotional disturbance
itself and not treat social maladjustment as an exclusion to
that definition.
B. LearningDisabilitiesand Response to Intervention
What about RTI? RTI is too promising an innovation to
squelch, but the problems of implementing it on a grand

325. See generally supra text accompanying notes 47-48 (discussing state
special education funding).
326. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982).
327. The Department of Education proposed dropping the term in 1982, but
the change never made it into the final regulation. See O'Neill, supra note 124,
at 1202 (citing 47 Fed. Reg. 33,836 (Aug. 4, 1982)).
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scale are too overwhelming to permit an unqualified
endorsement. It should be rolled out as a method to handle
suspected difficulties in reading mechanics for children in
the early grades. It should be extended to other suspected
disabilities and to older children only as the research base
justifies. If parents of a high-achieving child demand the
child's evaluation, discrepancy methods should be used.
Precisely when notice and other procedural rights kick in
may be unclear under present law, but as a matter of policy
it would make sense to afford full-fledged IDEA notice to
parents of all children selected for specialized intervention
under an RTI program. It would also be desirable, and
under a sensible interpretation of the law it should be
required, to make an eligibility determination within the
applicable timeline from the beginning of selection for RTI
services, unless the parents agree to an extension of time.
The lapse of the timeline does not mean that RTI services
should stop, but simply that the services should be
considered special education if the child meets eligibility
standards based on the information gathered to that point
and the parents consent to the services. RTI must not
become a means to avoid or delay providing IDEA
procedural and disciplinary protections. In fact, there is
good reason to believe that much parental opposition to RTI
would evaporate if school districts were to bind themselves
to afford IDEA or IDEA-like disciplinary protections to all
children placed in RTI programs. Even the best-case RTI
scenario is unlikely to eliminate all need for testing-based
approaches to LD, however. More than one means of8
evaluation must be used for eligibility determinations, 32
and additional means will need to be developed before
testing can be abandoned.
C. Racial Overrepresentationand Related Issues
The problem of overrepresentation of AfricanAmericans and other ethnic groups in some high-incidence

328. 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1414(b)(2)(A) (West 2008) (requiring school district to
"use a variety of assessment tools and strategies"), 1414(b)(2)(B) (forbidding
school district to "use any single measure or assessment as the sole criterion for
determining whether a child is a child with a disability"); 34 C.F.R.
§ 300.306(c)(i) (2008) (requiring school district to "[d]raw upon information from
a variety of sources, including aptitude and achievement tests").
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disability categories is vexing. The solution, however, rests
not with a redefinition of eligibility or with other
mechanisms that would keep children from gaining legal
rights to specialized services. Although non-special
education services that compensate for educational
disadvantage or cultural isolation would be a good thing,
the key to the overrepresentation problem is to keep
overrepresentation from being a problem. That is, the
potential harm from special education identification, chiefly
the forced separation of children into non-mainstream, lowexpectation programs, needs to be fixed. There are a
number of remedies to be undertaken. One is to expand inclass assistance through curricular adaptations and
accommodations, whether these are designated special
education or something else. 329 Another is to increase the
availability of after-school special education services
delivered either at home or elsewhere. Courts have edged
towards the recognition that specialized programs directed
at enabling children to succeed in the mainstream are a less
restrictive educational option than placing a child in a selfcontained special education class in the public school, and
so may be required irrespective of the fact that children
might still benefit educationally from fewer services in a
self-contained setting. For example, in L.B. v. Nebo School
District, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that a
young child with autism had to be kept in a private
mainstream preschool setting chosen by her parents, in
which she had an aide to assist her, and at the same time
receive thirty-five to forty hours a week of applied
behavioral analysis services at home, outside of the school
day. 330 The court rejected the school district's proposal for a
public preschool environment focusing on special education
(with a few nondisabled children also enrolled) and a lower
number of hours of applied behavioral analysis services
delivered at the school. 331 The court stressed that the extra
hours of services at home permitted the child to thrive in
preschool, making her the most academically advanced

329. In addition, state funding formulas that create financial incentives to
over-identify should be changed. See supra text accompanying note 45
(discussing incentives in funding formulas).
330. 379 F.3d 966 (10th Cir. 2004).
331. Id. at 978.
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child in her mainstream class. 332 Although the school
district argued that the child would receive some
educational benefit with the lower amount of services, the
court applied the statutory mandate in favor of the least
restrictive educational environment, a duty not bound by
the Rowley some-benefit standard. 333 If school systems,
prodded by courts, can break out of the six- to seven-hour
school day and set their sights on boosting the performance
of children with disabilities to academic excellence, a
special education designation will be a benefit, not a
disadvantage.
This imperative suggests another, the need to improve
special
education
services
in
general.
Numerous
commentators have suggested that the Rowley case was illconsidered 334 or has been rendered obsolete by changes to
the special education law in 1997 that stressed the goals of
independence and self-sufficiency. 335 Although courts
continue to cite and rely on Rowley, 336 they need to
recognize that its some-benefit standard does not govern
questions such as which services are needed for a child to be
educated in the least restrictive environment. 337 They also
need to understand that the No Child Left Behind
initiative, with its stress on bringing the achievement of all
children up to state grade-level standards, will inevitably
affect what is considered appropriate education under
332. Id. at 971.
333. See id. at 977-78.
334. See, e.g., Katharine T. Bartlett, The Role of Cost in Educational
Decisionmaking for the Handicapped Child, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring
1985, at 7, 47; Bonnie Poitras Tucker, Board of Education of the Hendrick
Hudson Central School District v. Rowley: Utter Chaos, 12 J.L. & EDUc. 235
(1983).
335. See, e.g., Scott F. Johnson, Reexamining Rowley: A New Focus in
Special Education Law, 2003 B.Y.U. EDUC. & L.J. 561, 574-75; Tara L. Eyer,
Comment, Greater Expectations: How the 1997 IDEA Amendments Raise the
Basic Floor of Opportunity for Children with Disabilities, 126 EDUC. L. REP. 1,
4-6 (1998).
336. See Julie F. Mead & Mark A. Paige, Board of Education of Hendrick
Hudson v. Rowley: An Examination of Its PrecedentialImpact, 37 J.L. & EDUC.
329, 329 (2008) (collecting cases) ("Rowley stands firm as the primary precedent
whenever the educational rights of children with disabilities are considered.").
337. See Mark C. Weber, The Least Restrictive Environment Obligation as
an Entitlement to Educational Services: A Commentary, 5 U.C. DAVIS J. Juv. L.
& POL'Y 147 (2001).
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IDEA. One of the primary purposes of the 2004 IDEA
33 8
Reauthorization was to harmonize NCLB and IDEA. 3If
the goal is to bring all children up to grade level by 2014, 39
education that fails to do so is hardly an appropriate
education for children with disabilities who could make
grade level performance with more intense programming. 340
Indeed, it may be argued that anything less fails to comply
with the federal definition of appropriate education as that
which "meet[s] the standards of the State educational
agency." 34 1 NCLB's requirement that adequate yearly
338. See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1400(c)(5)(C) (West 2008); Weber, supra note 23, at
16-21. One new IDEA requirement, drawn from NCLB, is that a child's
statement of educational services and aids be "based on peer-reviewed research
to the extent practicable" 20 U.S.C.A. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(IV); 34 C.F.R.
§ 300.320(a)(4) (2008). This measure is designed to force school districts to use
educational methodology that is proven to succeed, and should affect the
standard for appropriate education. See Jean B. Crockett & Mitchell L. Yell,
Without Data All We Have Are Assumptions: Revisiting the Meaning of a Free
Appropriate Public Education, 37 J.L. & EDUC. 381, 388 (2008) ("The inclusion
of this terminology may prove to be significant to future courts when
interpreting the [free, appropriate public education] mandate because the law
directs IEP teams, when developing a student's IEP, to base the special
education services to be provided on reliable evidence that the program or
service works.").
339. See 20 U.S.C.A. § 6311(a)(2)(F) (West Supp. 2008).
340. See Philip T.K. Daniel, "Some Benefit" or "Maximum Benefit" Does the
No Child Left Behind Act Render Greater Educational Entitlement to Students
with Disabilities,37 J.L. & EDUc. 347, 353 (2008) ("NCLB makes it clear that,
under federal law, students with disabilities are entitled to and expected to
meet the same high academic standards as non-disabled children. The
standards movement assumes that all students can achieve high levels of
learning if they receive high expectations, clearly defined standards, and
effective teaching to support achievement. These high expectations in state
education standards, however, are at odds with the core holding in Rowley that
school districts only need to meet the minimalist 'some educational benefit'
standard. The shift from process to outcome, which is at the heart of the
standards-based movement, also contradicts the Rowley finding that the
purpose of the IDEA is to provide access to education. The movement's
emphasis on content and proficiency focuses on what students actually learn,
.... "); see also Dixie Snow Huefner, Updatingthe FAPE Standard Under IDEA,
37 J.L. & EDUC. 367, 378 (2008) ("Under IDEA '04 the purpose of IDEA is no
longer merely to provide 'a basic floor of opportunity.' The expectation of
academic and functional progress calls for more than a floor."). But see Mr. C. v.
Me. Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 6, 538 F. Supp. 2d 298, 300-01 (D. Me. 2008)
(rejecting argument that amendments to IDEA in 2004 altered appropriate
education standard).
341. See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1401(9)(B). Children with severe cognitive disabilities
will not be able to meet grade-level standards, particularly in the upper grades,
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progress goals be met by subgroups that include both
minorities and students with disabilities3 42 may be the
prime motivator for schools to increase the intensity of
services given to both African-American children and
children with disabilities. For this reason, whatever one's
general opinion may be regarding standardized testing, 343
the subgroup focus of NCLB needs to be maintained.3 44
Will the stigma of disability remain, particularly the
stigma associated with learning disability or emotional
disturbance? Perhaps. Attitudes of the majority with regard
to race or disability, and, particularly, race and disability,
do not change easily. For the present and for the
foreseeable future, schools will need to take aggressive
steps to educate children without disabilities that
harassment is wrong and will be met with stern
disciplinary action. 345 Courts must be ready to provide
remedies when schools fail to do what they should.
CONCLUSION

At the present time, there does not appear to be an
adequate justification for eliminating eligibility requirements

but NCLB allows for this by allowing a small percentage of children to count
towards the total of children meeting proficiency standards based on alternate
educational assessments. 34 C.F.R. § 200.13(c)(ii) (2008). See generally Michelle
Croft, Note, Modified Assessments and No Child Left Behind: Beneficial to
Students with Disabilities but Potential Problems in Implementation, 11 J.
GENDER RACE & JUST. 513 (2008) (discussing alternate educational
assessments).
342. 20 U.S.C.A. § 6311(a)(2)(C)(v)(II) (West 2005).
343. See Weber, supra note 23, at 19-21 (noting criticisms of NCLB testing
regimen, particularly regarding children with disabilities).
344. NCLB requires that certain subgroups of children, including children
with disabilities, show adequate yearly progress in meeting proficiency
standards, just as the progress must be shown by the group of children in the
school as a whole and the children in each school. 20 U.S.C.A.
§ 6311(a)(2)(C)(v)(II)(cc).
345. See Weber, supra note 300, at 1155 & n.382 (listing voluntary action
that school districts should take to combat harassment of students with
disabilities); see also Paul M. Secunda, At the Crossroadsof Title IX and a New
"IDEA" Why Bullying Need Not Be 'A Normal Partof Growing Up" for Special
Education Children, 12 DUKE J. GENDER L. & PoLY 1 (2005) (discussing legal
remedies for bullying of children with disabilities).
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altogether. 346 Other programs may prove successful with
children whose problems do not stem from disability.
Moreover, federal dollars for the education of children with
disabilities should fund education of children with
disabilities, not be directed to other social priorities.
Nevertheless, the move towards broader disabilities
categories is to be applauded, and there is much to be said
for the extension of a legal entitlement to appropriate
services for children without disabilities who are the public
school system's "instructional casualties." The latter
development will need to await a political movement
comparable to the one that led to the special education
entitlement embodied in the 1975 Education for All
Handicapped Children Act.
There are measures, however, that should be taken to
reform special education eligibility and clean up the
eligibility mess that the courts and others have created.
The steps to do so are largely straightforward and do not
require legislative intervention. They simply require courts
and schools to follow the letter and spirit of the special
education law.

346. Some have suggested that the entitlements to an appropriate education
should apply to all children. See, e.g., Terry Jean Seligmann, supra note 183, at
761 ("A focus on the individual child's needs, parental involvement, enforceable
rights, and a range of services should be part of every school child's life, not only
those designated as 'special'.").

